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DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
JOHN P. FRANKt
THE recently published statement of Mr. Justice Jackson criticising
Mr. Justice Black for participating in a case 1 argued by a man who
twenty years before had been Black's law partner has brought the
subject of judicial disqualification sharply into the focus of public and
professional attention.2 Although Justice Jackson's views on the sub-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University; Visiting Professor, Yale University
School of Law, summer 1946.
Perhaps an article on judicial disqualification warrants a note on "author dis-
qualification." In the October, 1942 term, I was law clerk to Justice Hugo L. Black. That
relationship bred affections which may be reflected in this article. I have attempted to
present this subject as dispassionately as possible; but of this the reader must judge for
himself. I have been aided toward impartiality and in countless other ways by the many
Yale students who assisted me in seminar during the summer of 1946. Particular debt is
owing to Yale students William Coblentz, Gersten Rappaport, and Barbara Scott. Likewise
I would like to acknowledge the assistance given me by Mr. Eustace Seligman, of the firm
of Sullivan and Cromwell in New York, who contributed a memorandum on the practice
of the late Chief Justice Stone in cases presented by that firm, and by the more than forty
state chief justices and federal circuit judges who personally contributed to the study of cur-
rent practice presented here.
Of course none of those mentioned is responsible in any way for the points of vier. and
judgments expressed. J.P.F.
1. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167,325 U.S. 161,897 (1945).
2. The facts involved in the dispute are these: From approximately 1923 to 1925
Black and Mr. Crampton Harris engaged in the practice of law in Birmingham, Alabama.
In 1925 the association was terminated and both attorneys continued to practice separately.
In 1926 Black was elected to the Senate, where on one occasion he caused Harris to be re-
mined as counsel in a particular case for a Senate Committee of which Black was chairman.
Hearst v. Black, 87 F. (2d) 68 (App. D. C. 1936). In 1937, Senator Black Nas appointed to
the Supreme Court, and became a permanent resident of Alexandria, Virginia. In the past
five years he has seen Harris socially perhaps once or twice for a few minutes.
Meanwhile Harris continued in Birmingham practice with a mixed clientele including
several labor unions. During the coal strike of 1943 he was special counsel for the United
Mine Workers before the National War Labor Board. Somewhat earlier he instituted iii
Birmingham the first "portal to portal" case, presenting the question whether travel time
underground of iron ore miners required payment under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The case was successfully prosecuted by Harris to the United States Supreme Court where
Mr. Justice Black participated in the decision. Tennessee Coal, Iron, & Railroad Co. v.
Muscoda Local, 321 U. S. 590 (1944).
A year later Harris brought a second case involving portal to portal pay, this time for
his coal miner clients, to the Supreme Court. This case had been instituted in West Virginia
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ject are not at all points clear,3 his statement shows an enormous differ-
ence of opinion in the Supreme Court on the subject of disqualification
of its members. This article undertakes to survey the present Ameri-
can disqualification practice, to study its origins, and to explore the
support for the varying views on the immediate subject of justices and
their ex-partners.4
In the preparation of this article an Inquiry has been submitted to
the chief justices of the various states and to judges of each federal
and the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals declared it to be covered by the Miuscoda case. Local
No. 6167 v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 145 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944). On certiorari to
the Supreme Court Harris again appeared and Black again participated. Mr. Harris and
his miners prevailed again, but this time three Justices dissented, seeing a difference in the
application of the law to coal miners. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U. S.
161,897 (1945).
In neither the iron case nor the coal case had counsel suggested that Mr. Justice Black
be disqualified by reason of his association 19 years previously with Mr. Harris or for any
other reason. Nor had it been raised in previous Harris cases, as for example Carolene
Products Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 18 (1944), in which all members of the Court had
decided against Harris' client. But on petition for rehearing in the coal case, counsel for the
Company contended for the first time that Black should have been disqualified for reason,
among others, of the Harris association.
The petition for rehearing was denied, with Justices Jackson and Frankfurter filing a
short memorandum noting that they did not consider it within their province to express any
view whatsoever on the merits of the disqualification controversy. This was an unusual
procedure since motions for rehearing raising an alleged disqualification are normally passed
upon by the whole court without comment. For example in United States v. Jacobs, 306
U. S. 363, 620 (1939), the whole court denied a motion for rehearing based on the ground that
Black was disqualified because he was a member of the Senate when the judges' retirement
bill was passed and thus could not participate under Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 of the Constitution.
Moreover, in Ryan v. Newfield, 302 U. S. 650, 777 (1937) the whole court denied a motion
and a second motion for rehearing in which it was alleged that Black was disqualified on
personal grounds.
The Jewell Ridge rehearing incident, which had never had any public attention, ap-
peared forgotten until it was casually mentioned in a news story at the time of the recent
vacancy in the Chief Justiceship, Washington Evening Star, May 16, 1946. The subject
was again apparently forgotten until Justice Jackson's statement to the Judiciary Com-
mittees, N. Y. Times, June 11, 1946, p. 2, col. 3. Justice Jackson stated that in his absence
columnists had implied "that offensive behavior on my part is responsible for the feud on
the court." He referred to the Star story as "the most specific attack on me" and stated his
determination to "reveal the undisclosed part of my story."
3. Originally Justice Jackson declared, in his opinion in the Jawell Ridge case, that
Black's conduct was not his concern. Subsequently, moreover, he emphasized in his letter
to the Congressional committees that "I do not want it inferred that Justice Black's sitting
in the Jewell Ridge case involved lack of 'honor.' " Nevertheless, Jackson continued in the
statement to say that he "wanted the practice stopped," and concluded with the threat that
"if it is ever repeated while I am on the bench I will make my Jewell Ridge opinion look
like a letter of recommendation in comparison." See letter of Associate Justice Robert H.
Jackson to Congressional Judiciary Committee, N. Y. Times, June 11, 1946, p. 2, col. 3.
4. This article will not attempt encyclopedic detail of citation. With perhaps 2500
case entries in the Digest system on disqualification, with code provisions in every state, and
with at least 60 articles in the law reviews, each footnote would be an article were it to trace
[Vol. 56: 605
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Circuit Court of Appeals to find out from appellate judges themselves
when they disqualify, particularly in situations which may not be
reflected in cases or statutes. The information obtained from the In-
quiry is utilized in sections of this article, but in order that the reports
of the thirty-nine participating state and federal courts may speak for
themselves, the totals on various points are included in an appendix.
The subject of judicial disqualification is one of consequence con-
siderably broader than the superficial question of whether Mr. Justice
Jacksori is a patriot among sinners, as some imply, or a fool among wise
men, as his critics may contend.5 The Jackson charge raises a substan-
tial issue of whether judges should disqualify themselves in cases pre-
sented by former partners. There is no statute governing disqualifica-
tion of federal appellate judges, and the various Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal judges must decide whether to follow Black's practice or Jackson's
recommendation. State judges, too, to the extent that they are not
governed by statute, must make the same decision. The federal dis-
trict judges also must face the problem, for under the statute governing
the details. Notes and comments in legal periodicals will be cited for the reader who may
desire detail on a particular point, and cases and statutes selected for citation are chosen
either because they are typical or unusual, and not for the sake of completeness. The sub-
ject of waiver of disqualification will not be treated beyond this notation that the views on
waiver are divided into three: that disqualification is generally waivable, that it is never
waivable because it is jurisdictional, and that it is wivaible as to some grounds and not
others. For examples of the latter view, see Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 562, 6 P.
(2d) 944 (1932) and Collins v. Nelson, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 42, 78 P. (2d) 758 (1938) (both
holding that where a judge sits who is disqualified for interest, relationship, or prior par-
ticipation in a case, the defect is jurisdictional and the judgment void); Wooley v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 611, 66 P. (2d) 680 (1937); Rohr v. Johnson, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 203,
150 P. (2d) 5 (1944) (both holding that disqualification for prejudice may be v.aived).
Where the doctrine of waiver is applied, the objection may be too late if not seasonably
raised even though the bias of the judge is gross. Foreman v. Hunter, 59 Iova 550, 13 N. W.
659 (1882) (waiver where judge contributed to fund to procure witnesses for plaintiff). For
extended annotations on waiver see Notes (1920) 5 A. L. R. 1588; (1928) 57 A. L. R. 292.
Nor does this article deal with corruption of judges or any forms of money payments to
judges by attorneys. See, e.g., (1937) 62 A. B. A. REP. 756 (attorney pays judge $S,000 of
receiver's fee); Legal Ethics and Professional Discipline (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 1017, 1018 (loan
by attorney to wife of judge); Frank, Are Judges Human? (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. R1v. 17,
33-5.
5. The following instances typify the press reaction to the Jackson charges: David
Lawrence expressed gratitude that Jackson had the courage to "expose the irregular situa-
tion," N. Y. Sun, June 17, 1946, p. 17, col. 1. On the other hand the Macon, Ga. News,
June 17, 1946, took the position that "Justice Jackson is an ass." In an editorial thus
headed the News said: "Mr. Justice Black . . . has done no wrong and has been guilty of
no impropriety in the particular case, except in the perverted imagination of a disappointed
aspirant for the post of Chief Justice. .. ." The extremely conservative Republican press
took the opportunity to say "A plague on both your houses"; see, e.g., Chicago Tribune
editorial, June 12, 1946. A substantial minority of the more temperate press took the view
that it did not know when judges should and when they should not disqualify and therefore
remained neutral; see, e.g., editorial Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 12,1946.
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their conduct they may be required to decide whether hearing an ex-
partner will constitute "prejudice" within the law.6
But the enormous body of disqualification law I raises many ques-
tions quite removed from the extremely unusual ex-partner issue.
While disqualification only occasionally attracts widespread public at-
tention-as it did early in this century in Montana 8 and very recently
in Delaware-it is much before the courts and legislatures. Each state
has some statutory or constitutional law on the subject, but all shadings
of view on particular grounds for disqualification are discovered. The
traditional grounds of disqualification for interest, for relationship, or
for bias, set a general framework for most states; but within that frame-
work there is room for wide variety.
The divergencies stem from two fundamentally different policies
which govern the field. All courts want justice done, but the conflict
of values comes over method: if disqualification of judges is too easy,
both the cost and the delay of justice go out of bounds. If disqualifica-
tion is too hard, cases may be decided quickly, but unfairly. Nowhere
is that conflict of values more glaring than in the United States Su-
preme Court, where the cases are usually important. If a justice sits
who should not, great interests may be jeopardized; but if a justice
disqualifies who should not, vital questions may be needlessly left with-
out authoritative decision. For under existing law, there is no proce-
dure for replacing a disqualified justice of the Supreme Court even
6. 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 25 (1940), discussed in text, infra pp. 626-630.
7. The best general articles are Putnam, Recusation (1923) 9 CORN. L. Q. 1 (an his-
torical account); Notes (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 594; (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 78; (1941)
51 YALE L. J. 169. For detailed discussion of narrower aspects of the problem, see (1931)
65 U. S. L. R v. 68; (1933) 67 id. 487; (1928) 13 CoRr. L. Q.454 (all dealing with federal prac-
tice); (1914) 2 VA. L. REv. 147; (1920) 6 CORN. L. Q. 117; (1943) 21 TEx. L. RE V. 790;
(1938) 72 U. S. L. REv. 241 (all dealing with relationship between judges and attorneys);
(1915) 29 HARV. L. Rav. 103; (1944) 42 MicH. L. REv. 1127 (both dealing with necessity);
(1927) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 263; (1926) 5 TENN. L. REv. 106 (both dealing with waiver); (1920)
4 MiN. L. REv. 301 (disqualification of stock owners); (1920) 8 CALIF. L. Ray. 344 (interest);
(1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 1167 (effect of participation of disqualified judge); (1938) 36 Micu.
L. REv. 985 (appointment by governor of substitute for disqualified judge); (1928) 23 ILL.
L. REv. 394 (disqualification where judge receives part of fine); (1942) 16 TULANE L. REV.
627 (Louisiana practice); (1923) 8 VA. L. REG. (N.s.) 801 (Virginia practice); (1922) 20
OHio L. REP. 47 (Ohio practice); (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 430 (disqualification of Judge
Hillyer in Colorado strike cases).
8. Disqualification created a serious political controversy in Montana in 1903. In a
controversy between copper companies, a judge friendly to a company party issued an
injunction against the adversary. The state supreme court held that there could be no dis-
qualification for bias, State ex rel. Anaconda Co. v. District Court, 28 Mont, 590, 76 Pac,
1133 (1903). The legislature was called into special session and passed the present law.
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. (1935) § 8868(4); cf. Mont. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 1903, c. 3. See
HOWARD, MONTANA: HIGE, WIDE, AND HANDSOME (1943) 66 el seg. particularly at p. 80,
For the Delaware incident, see note 54 infra.
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when his non-participation deprives the litigants of the statutory
quorum necessary for decision. 9
The polar views are expressed thus:
By New Mexico, an "easy" disqualification state:
"Our Legislature in effect has said that a judge, even though
blessed with all of the virtues any judge ever possessed, shall not be
permitted to exercise judicial power to determine the fact of his own
disqualifications, not because the judge in doing so would attempt
to act otherwise than conscientiously, but because in their legisla-
tive judgment it is not fitting for him to make such an attempt, and
it is better that the courts shall maintain the confidence of the peo-
ple than that the rights of judge and litigant in a particular case be
served." 10
By Pennsylvania, a "hard" disqualification state:
"Due consideration should be given by him [the judge] to the
fact that the administration of justice should be beyond the appear-
ance of unfairness. But while the mediation of courts is based upon
the principal of judicial impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness
pervading the whole system of judicature, so that courts may as
near as possible be above suspicion, there is, on the other side, an
important issue at stake; that is, that causes may not be unfairly
prejudiced, unduly delayed, or discontent created through un-
founded charges of prejudice or unfairness made against the judge
in the trial of a cause." 11
The cases and statutes reflect, as might be expected, a mixture of
these two views. All jurisdictions have some disqualifications 12 and
all draw a line where they believe the privilege of disqualification may
be abused.
ORIGINS
The common law of disqualification, unlike the civil law, was clear
and simple: a judge was disqualified for direct pecuniary interest and
for nothing else. Although Bracton tried unsuccessfully to incorporate
into English law the view that mere "suspicion" by a party was a basis
9. See the discussion infra p. 626 describing the recent impasse in which a nunbar
of cases of importance could not be decided by the United States Supreme Court bcaue of
lack of quorum due to disqualifications.
10. State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, Judge, 38 N. M. 73, 28 P. (2d) 511,512 (1933). For
similar views see Callaham v. Childers, 186 Okla. 504, 99 P. (2d) 126 (1940); State ex Td.
Bennett v. Childers, 188 Okla. 14, 105 P. (2d) 762 (1940); U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77,
245 Pac. 1074 (1926).
11. In re Crawford's Estate, 307 Pa. 102, 160 Ad. 585,387 (1931).
12. The conflict of values indicated by the Crawford and Hannah cases can exist withia
a state. Compare City of Palatka v. Frederick, 128 Fla. 366, 370, 174 So. 826, 827-8 (1937),
with State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 520, 194 So. 613, 615 (1940).
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for disqualification,13 it was Coke who, with reference to cases in which
the judge's pocketbook was involved, set the standards for his time in
his injunction that "no man shall be a judge in his own case." 11 Black-
stone rejected absolutely the possibility that a judge might be dis-
qualified for bias as distinguished from interest. "
Pecuniary interest took many forms. A judge might be disqualified,
as in Dr. Bonham's Case, 6 because he received the fine which he had
the power to inflict; and the Mayor of Hertford"7 was "layed by the
heels" for sitting as judge in an ejectment case in which he was lessor
of the plaintiff. A similar charge of interest arose where the judge's
status as citizen and taxpayer of a unit of society might be affected by
his decision. Thus, for example, in a case involving a pauper, a judge
was disqualified for interest because the decision affected his taxes."'
13. "Causa vero recusationis unica est, scilicet suspicio, quae consurgit multis ex causis,
scilicet si iustitiarius sit consanguineus petentis, homo vel subditus, parens vel amicus, vel
inimicus tenentis, affinis, familiaris vel commensalis, consiliarius, vel narrator suus extiterit
in causa ilia vel alia ex huiusmodi." 4 BRACTON, DELEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINInUS ANGLIAE
(Woodbine's ed. 1942) 281. Bracton's views as thus expressed are close to the most ad-
vanced modern practice; a judge should disqualify, says Bracton, if he is related to a party,
if he is hostile to a party, if he has been counsel in the case. However his inclusion of the
phrases "amicus" and "consiliarius . . . in causa ilia vel alla," if it refers to a judge-party
relationship as we know it, is not present practice; that is, judges very rarely disqualify be-
cause a party is a friend or because they were counsel for a party in a different case. Both
questions are discussed in the text, infra. For discussion of the sources of Bracton's views
and for elaborate citation to the principal authorities on medieval recusation practice see
Schultz, A New A pproach to Bracton (1944) 2 SEMINAR (Catholic University) 41, 42-50, and
particularly p. 45 n. 9.
14. "Aliguis non debet esse judex in propria causa." Co. LiTr. *141a.
15. "By the laws of England, also, in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might be
refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges and justices
cannot be challenged For the law will not suppose the possibility of bias or favor in a
judge. . . ." 3 BL. Comm. *361. This conclusion is sharply criticized in Sanborn v. Fellows,
22 N. H. 473,481 (1851).
16. 8 Co. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K. B. 1608). See also Day v. Savadge, Hobart 85,
87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (K. B. 1613), declaring it to be "against natural equity" to let a
city participate in decision of case effecting it. For an extended statement see opinion of
Holt in City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. §69, 687,88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1601 (K. B. 1702).
17. Anon., per Holt, C. J., 1 Salk. 396, 91 Eng. Rep. 343 (K. B. 1698); and similarly
Earl of Derby's Case, 12 Co. 114, 77 Eng. Rep. 1390 (K. B. 1614). Cf. Company of Mercers
v. Bowker, 1 Strange 639, 93 Eng. Rep. 751 (K. B. 1725), in which a member of the Com-
pany became judge after verdict and before judgment, and the decision was held reversible
because of his participation. It was also held that a judge could not pass on his own qualifi-
cations as bondsman, Sir Nicholas Bacon's Case, 2 Dyer 220b, 73 Eng. Rep. 487 (K. B.
1563). The earliest significant discussion of bias of this type is a case concerning the right
of the Chancellor of Oxford to hear a trespass case in which he was involved, M. of 11. 6,
18-21, pl. 6. For a detailed exposition of the case see EGERTON, A DiscounrsE UPON Tor,
STATUTES (Thorne ed. 1942) 71-3. Mr. Thorne has collected other year book citations at
the conclusion of his note 154, p. 73. For summary of early cases see 2 ROLL. AnR. 93, 94,
and BROOKE ABR., Tit. Judges, Justices. See also 4 Cost. Dir. 6.
18. Between the Parishes of Great Charte and Kennington, 2 Strange 1173, 93 Eng.
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The last-mentioned cases went too far, for if judges were disqualified
as tax-payers some suits could scarcely be decided. Mindful of this
difficulty Parliament in 1743 provided that taxpaying justices of the
peace might sit in these local government cases.10 Thus grew the mod-
em rule of "necessity," that judges should not decline to sit where no
substitute was readily available. As Pollock later expressed it, "the
settled rule of law is that, although a judge had better not, if it can be
avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any per-
sonal interest, yet he not only may, but must do so if the case cannot
be heard otherwise." 21 And this remains American practice.2'
A variant of "interest" is "relationship," the problem posed where a
judge participates in a case involving his relative. Oddly enough, the
English courts, over-influenced by Coke, early held that a judge was
not disqualified by relationship, but that a jury was.22 In the latter
connection, courts were faced with deciding what degree of relationship
necessitated disqualification, a problem which in its modem context
remains as perplexing today as it was then. As was noted in 1572, "all
the inhabitants of the earth are descended from Adam and Eve, and
so are cousins of one another," but "the further removed blood is, the
more cool it is." The line was drawn in that case at the ninth degree.
23
In short, English common law practice at the time of the establish-
ment of the American court system was simple in the extreme. Judges
Rep. 1107 (K. B. 1726), and see Case of Foxham Tithing, 2 Salk. 607, 91 Eng. Rep. S14
(K. B. 1705).
19. 16 Geo. II., c. 18, § 1 (1743).
20. PoLLocK, FIRST BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE (6th ed. 1929) 270.
21. Thus federal judges must pass on the applicability to themselves of an income tax,
Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920), although Taney earlier expressed the vie.v in a letter
denouncing such a tax as invalid that the matter could not be considered in a case because
"... all the Judges of the Courts of the United States have an interest in the question, and
could not therefore with propriety undertake to hear and decide it." TYLER, MEMOiR Or
ROGER B. TANEY (1872) 433. For annotation on the general subject of necessity, see Note
(1925) 39 A. L. R. 1476. Chancellor Kent accepted the doctrine of necesity to the extent
of sitting in a case in which his brother-in-law was plaintiff because there was no method of
choosing an alternate chancellor. Moers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. 360 (N. Y. 1822), explained
in In re Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39 (N. Y. 1846). Other modern cases in point are State ex rd.
Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 157 Kan. 622, 143 P. (2d) 652 (1943), and Price v. Fitzpatrick,
85 NV. Va. 76, 100 S. E. 872 (1919). With a little ingenuity, a situation of "necessity" can
occasionally be avoided. Thus in a case in which all the members of the Teas Supreme
Court were Woodmen of the World and hence the entire court vas disqualified in a case in-
volving that group, the Governor appointed a special court of three women. For the re-
sultant three opinions see Johnson v. Darr, 144 Tex. 516,272 S. W. 1098 (1925).
22. Brookes v. Rivers, 1 Hardres 503, 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex. 166S) (judge need not
disqualify in his brother-in-law's case "for favour shall not be presumed in a judge"). Contra:
Becquet v. Lempriere, 1 Knapp 376, 12 Eng. Rep. 362 (P. C. 1830) (Isle of Jersey decision).
Yet an entire jury would be stricken if the sheriff who called its members was related to a
party. Vernon v. Manners, 2 Plowden 425, 75 Eng. Rep. 639 (K. B. 1572).
23. Vernon v. Manners, 2 Plowden 425,75 Eng. Rep. 639 (K. B. 1572).
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disqualified for financial interest. No other disqualifications were per-
mitted, and bias, today the most controversial ground for disqualifica-
tion, was rejected entirely.
GENERAL AMERICAN PRACTICE
The contemporary disqualification practice of both federal and state
courts is broader than that of the common law. Not only has the prin-
ciple of pecuniary interest been extended to keep pace with changing
economic institutions, but relationship between judge and litigant,and
a variety of other types of judicial bias have been prohibited in modern
practice by the common law.24
Expansion of common law concepts has been brought about in the
federal appellate courts, where no statute controls, largely through the
exercise of their own discretion. In the Supreme Court disqualification
has always been the prerogative of each individual Justice, and prior to
the Jewell Ridge incident no member of the Court has ever pronounced
public judgment on the practice of another. 5 From the beginning the
practice seems to have been founded upon a mixture of common law
notions, individual judgments of propriety, and practicability. While
statutes do not explicitly apply to Supreme Court practice, the impulse
of individual justices has generally been to'adopt their principles."
State judges have more often been subjected to limitations im-
posed by statute. In this respect older states have generally adhered
fairly closely to the common law with only slight doctrinal and statu-
tory variations. Newer states, on the other hand, have tended to adopt
elaborate codes which fall into three categories: (1) disqualification for
specified grounds in addition to those recognized at common law; 21
(2) mandatory change of venue statutes, themselves of several distinct
types, which often supplement the first method listed; 28 and (3) au-
24. See, e.g., People ex rel. Rusch v. Cunningham, 308 Ill. App. 63, 31 N. E. (2d) 369
(1941) (political bias); Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410, 199 S. W. 67 (1917) (relationship).
25. In some jurisdictions, the matter of disqualification of a judge can be decided by
the whole court. Board of Justices v. Fennimore, 1 N. J. L. 190 (1793); State ex red Short v.
Martin, 125 Okla. 24, 256 Pac. 681 (1927); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores, 157 Kan.
622, 143 P. (2d) 652 (1943). The Inquiry shows that in almost all courts, disqualification in
doubtful cases is at least informally discussed with other judges.
26. "I think there is no statute which excludes a Supreme Court Justice from sitting
even in these cases, but statutes would have prevented a district judge, and I think also a
circuit court of appeals judge sitting in these cases under like conditions.
"And it has always seemed to the Court that when a district judge could not sit in a case
because of his previous association with it, or a circuit court of appeals judge, it was our
manifest duty to take the same position." Testimony of Chief Justice Stone, HIearings before
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 24. The Chief Jus.
tice's memory played him false in his inclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals judges under
the statutes.
27. See LA. CODE PRAC. (Dart. 1942) art. 338, listing six grounds of disqualification.
28. An example is the federal provision, 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 25 (1940),
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thorization of optional recusation, largely at the discretion of the
judge.29
Interest. The current practice in cases involving interest is a logical
extension of common law principles to cover modem situations. Thus
it is now almost universal practice for judges not to sit in cases involving
corporations in which they own stock. 0 Doubts concerning the wisdom
of this practice have been expressed,3 1 but have been quashed except in
a few instances where the holdings are extremely small and the cor-
poration so large that the decision is quite unlikely to be affected.
3 2
29. An example is the federal provision, 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 24 (1940).
In sharp contra-distinction to the view that recusation may be optional with the judge is
the very common position that judges must sit unless a common law or statutory ground
of recusation precludes. Hamilton v. Pendleton, 111 0kla. 55, 237 Pac. 611 (1925); Love v.
Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S. W. (2d) 515 (1930), holding that judge must sit no matter how
embarrassing if there is no common law or statutory ground for disqualification. See also
Exparte State Bar Association, 92 Ala. 113,8 So. 768 (1891); Note (1935) 96 A. L. R. 546.
The extreme view that disqualification outside a statutory ground is discretionary with
the trial judge is typified by expressions in Boswell v. Flockheart, 8 Leigh 364 (Va. 1837);
Ex parte Bowles, 164 Md. 318, 165 Adt. 169 (1933); and Musser v. 3rd Judicial District, 106
Utah 373, 148 P. (2d) 802 (1944). This discretion may be used to opposite effect, i.e., to
permit judges to disqualify at will although statutes do not command it, Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
30. Dimes v. Grand Junc. Canal, 3 H. L. Cas. 759, 10 Eng. Rep. 301 (1852); (1920)
4 Mime. L. Rnv. 301.
31. Compare views of Lord Chancellor Cranworth in London and N. W. Ry. v. Lindsay,
3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 99, 114 (1858), with the view there attributed to Lord Eldon that a
judge might appropriately sit in a case concerning a corporation in which he owned stock.
32. Two state chief justices, in their responses to the Inquiry, state the judges of their
court disqualify in stock holding situations unless the corporation is very large and the
judge's holding very small. Two of the federal circuit judges also state that members of their
court have sat where the holding is "infinitesimal." A judge was not disqualified where he
was a shareholder in a bank, only indirectly interested in litigation, In re Farber, 260 Mich.
652, 245 N. W. 793 (1932); and the judge was not disqualified as shareholder in a corporation
holding most of shares in bank which was party defendant in eminent domain proceedings.
Central Pac. Ry. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 706, 296 Pac. 883 (1931); but compare with
the latter case City of Vallejo v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. 408, 249 Pac. 1084 (1926). A judge
is generally not disqualified if a relative holds shares in a corporation. Goodman v. Wiscon-
sin Elect. Power Co., 248 Wis. 52, 20 N. NV. (2d) 553 (1945), 162 A. L. R. 649, 654 (1946).
For general notes on the relative-shareholder disqualification, see Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 617.
Large corporations face a very similar problem because their directors are customarily
barred from passing upon corporate transactions with other concerns in which the directors
may have an interest. The U. S. Steel Corporation includes in its by-laws a clause recogniz-
ing that its directors "are men of large and diversified interests" and provides that none of
the U. S. Steel contracts shall be affected by interlocking relationships between the U. S.
Steel directors and the other contracting party if there is present at the U. S. Steel meeting
passing on the contract "a quorum of directors not so interested." 1 FLETCHEre's CoRoRA-
TION FoRsiS (3d Ed. 1938) 736.
In Scotland, judges are relieved of disqualification where their stock holding "interest"
is very slight as where they are partners in joint stock insurance companies or where they
hold stock as trustees. See Lamond, Of Interest as a Disqualification in Judges (1907) 23
ScoT. L. Rnv. 152.
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Where the judge has an interest other than direct ownership the issue
becomes the remoteness of the interest. For example, where a judge is
executor of an estate owning shares in a corporation appearing before
him, is the interest so remote as to make disqualification unnecessary? 3
Analogous problems are presented where the judge is a creditor 14 or
guardian 31 of a party; where his political career may be affected by an
election fraud case; 11 where he is an officer of a corporation defending
or prosecuting the action; 11 and where a relative from whom he may
inherit is a shareholder in a corporate litigant."8 While disagreement
as to the danger of judicial prejudice is understandable in the foregoing
situations, the reasoning of the court which refused to disqualify a
judge in a case against a cemetery corporation merely because his rela-
tives were buried on its property seems incontrovertible.39
The interest problem frequently recurs in cases where the outcome
may slightly affect taxes or utility rates in the judge's home community.
Under common law, as noted above, that circumstance would dis-
qualify. But today such an interest is considered too remote to justify
application of the principle, and courts have generally rejected the
strict common law doctrine."
33. See Knight v. Hardeman, 17 Ga. 253 (1855) (judge held disqualified under rather
unusual circumstances of that case).
34. Not disqualified in Fuller v. Davis, 73 Me. 556 (1882); Dial v. Martin, 37 S. W.
(2d) 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 57 S. W. (2d) 75 (Comm. App. 1933);
but cf. Burks v. Bennett, 62 Tex. 277 (1884). A judge was disqualified where he was legal
adviser to a bank creditor of a party in Jones v. American Central Ins. Co., 83 Kan. 44, 109
Pac. 1077 (1910).
35. See Richter v. Leiby's Estate, 107 Wis. 404, 83 N. W. 694 (1900) (considering the
effect of various guardian relationships).
36. See People ex tel. Rusch v. Lidovsky, 308 Il. App. 60, 31 N. E. (2d) 372 (1941).
37. In New Hampshire, 'a judge who is an officer in a railroad corporation is disqualified
by statute, N. H. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 373, § 12. A judge who terminates his interest
in a party before trial was held qualified to sit in Table Mountain Gold Co. v. Waller's
Co., 4 Nev. 218 (1868). And see note 32 supra.
38. Not disqualified in Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Williams, 117 Tex. 218,
300 S. W. 44 (1927). That this is the general rule see cases and annotations cited supra,
note 32.
39. Houston Cemetery Co. v. Drew, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 536, 36 S. W. 802 (1896). But a
probate judge was disqualified where he was-vestryman and trustee of a church left money
in a will. State ex tel. Colcord v. Young, 31 Fla. 594, 12 So. 673 (1893).
40. Statutes permitting judges to sit in such situations have been considered necessary
in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., Peck v. Freeholders of Essex, 21 N. J. L. 656 (1847), dis-
qualifying a judge for residence, and the reversing statute, N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) § 2:26-'
193; Waters v. Day, 10 Vt. 487 (1838) and VT. PUB. LAws (1933) § 1237. Such a statute
may be very narrowly construed. Compare W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 5212, with City
of Grafton v. Holt, 58 W. Va. 182, 52 S. E. 21 (1905).
However the same result is often reached without a specific statute, Prawdzik v. Grand
Rapids, 313 Mich. 376, 21 N. W. (2d) 168 (1946). For early American hesitant acceptance
of this view see Board of Justices v. Fennimore, 1 N. J. L. 190 (1793) with which compare
the Peck case, supra. The result may be reached by narrow construction of the statutory
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Supreme Court Justices have from the earliest times disqualified
themselves in cases involving direct pecuniary interest. The practice
was initiated in 1813 by Justice Livingston in Livingston & Gilchrist v.
Maryland Insurance Co. 41 and immediately followed by Chief Justice
Marshall in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 42 decided the same
year-.
Relationship. The relationship cases present two distinct problems-
that of the party relative and that of the attorney relative. Where it is
the litigant who is a kinsman the proximity of the relationship is the
decisive factor in determining whether disqualification is necessary.
Brothers, uncles and cousins merely begin the possibilities, for the
judge's relatives by marriage may also appear as parties. The English
view that judges might hear cases brought by relatives was quickly
abandoned in America by statute, but these laws vary widely in pre-
scribing the degree of relationship necessary to exclude a judge from
hearirg a case.
43
Of far greater consequence in the law today are the cases in which the
word "interest," City of Henderson v. Fields, 258 S. W. 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); but cf.
Nalle v. City of Austin, 85 Tex. 520, 22 S. IV. 668 (1893). For a note discussing the general
rule that a judge is not disqualified by reason of residence in a community party, see (1924)
33 A L. R. 1322. Typical modem English cases permitting participation in such cases are
Queen v. Handsley, 8 Q. B. D. 383 (1881); Ex parte Overseers of Workington, [1894] 1 Q. B.
416.
In California a statute forbids judges to sit in cases involving the irrigation districts in
which they live, Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigati6n Dist. v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 315, 187
Pac. 1056 (1920); but cf. Cuyamaca Water Co. v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. 584, 226 Pac. 604
(1924). For a case of disqualification for interest where the case involves the judge's com-
munity, see Mackey v. Crump, 49 Okla. 578, 153 Pac. 1128 (1915).
41. 7 Cranch 506 (U. S. 1813).
42. 7 Cranch 603 (U. S. 1813). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat 304
(U. S. 1816); 4 BEVERoGE, THE LIFE oF JoHN MARsHALL (1929) 145-161. Justices have
continued to disqualify in cases of direct pecuniary interest. In Blagge v. Balch, 162 U. S.
439 (1896), in which Gray's father was involved, Gray did not sit. White, as recipient of a
sugar bounty, disqualified in United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427 (1896). A letter by
Mr. G. E. Morrison to the "Everybody's Ideas" Column of the Minneapolis Star Journal,
July 16, 1946, relates an anecdote about Chief Justice Wite which Mr. Morrison stated
had been told him by "an aged New Orleans newspaper man who said he had personal knowl-
edge of the facts." According to the Morrison letter Nhite furnished his first law office on a
$1,000 prize which he won in the Louisiana lottery. The $5.00 with which White bought his
lottery ticket had been paid him as a legal fee by his first client. Many years later Wh"ite
joined in the opinion terminating the Louisiana lottery by Federal Statute, Champion v.
Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
43. Statutes such as the first federal act, 1 STAT. 278 (1792), in modern form as 36 STAT.
1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 24 (1940), early permitted disqualifications in relative cases. A
systematic review of the general field of disqualification, with detailed citation on relation-
ship problems, is contained in Moses v. Julian, 45 N. H. 52, 56 (1863). A New York case
which draws logical but unfortunate conclusions from the fact that relationship was not dis-
qualifying at common law and that the statute must be strictly construed is Matter of
Dodge and Stevenson Mfg. Co., 77 N. Y. 101 (1879). An excellent opinion which engrafted
1947]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
attorney, rather than the party, is the possible object of nepotism. In a
substantial number of jurisdictions the relationship of the attorney is
not per se grounds for disqualification. The common law admitted of
no such disqualification, and statutes frequently confine disqualifica-
tion to cases in which the parties are related. In most jurisdictions,
therefore, a judge need not disqualify himself unless the attorney can
be considered a "party."
The question of whether or not the attorney is a "party" is often, but
not always,44 made to depend on whether or not he receives a contingent
fee. If he does, or if his fee is set by the court, the judicial relative is
disqualified in many jurisdictions.4 The opposite result is usual where
the fee is not contingent .4  This practice lends itself to the drawing of
some exceedingly fine lines.' Thus in Mississippi a judge is disqualified
if his kin receives a fee fixed by a percentage of the recovery by his
client, but not if he receives a lump sum contingent upon his prevailing
in the cause.
47
the usual principles of relationship into the common law of the jurisdiction is Petrey v.
Holliday, 178 Ky. 410, 199 S. W. 67 (1917).
For examples of the variations, relationship is measured to the third degree in Nevada,
NEv. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 8407. California also sets the relation at the third degree, CAL.
CODE CIv. PRO. (Deering, 1937) § 170(3), but adds relationship to an officer of a corporate
party as a ground of disqualification. Lynip v. Alturas School Dist., 29 Cal. App. 158, 155
Pac. 109 (1915). As degrees are counted in some third degree states, a judge may properly
sit in the case of his first cousin. REv. STAT. WASH. ANN. (Rem., 1932) § 54 (3), In New
Hampshire, disqualification is through the fourth degree by common law, Sanborn v. Fel-
lows, 22 N. H. 473, 488 (1851). In Indiana, relationship to the 6th degree disqualifies, ANN.
IND. STAT. (Burns, 1933)§ 9-1303.
The disqualification may also be stated in the most general terms, as "connected with
him by affinity or consanguinity" without specification of a degree, Miss. CoDE ANN. (1942)
§ 1651, discussed in Nimocks v. McGehee, 97 Miss. 321, 52 So. 626 (1910); WIs, STAT. (1945)
§ 261.06; and it may also be stated in terms of named relationships, such as cousins or
nieces, REv. CODE OF DEL. (1935) § 4410.
While relationship runs both by consanguinity and affinity the view is fairly common
that these disqualifications are removed upon the death of the wife; Blodget v. Brinsanild, 9
Vt. 27 (1837). For a collection of cases on this latter point see Note (1938) 117 A. L. R. 800.
44. In a number of states the judge related to an attorney is not disqualified whether
or not the attorney receives a contingent fee. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. McDonald, 50
Ga. App. 856, 179 S. E. 185 (1935); Sjoberg v. Nordin, 26 Minn. 501, 5 N. W. 677 (1880);
King v. Security Co., 241 Pa. 547, 88 Atl. 789 (1913); Postal Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Ellis,
140 Tex. 570, 169 S. W. (2d) 482 (1943) (holding that the judge is not disqualified where his
son receives a contingent fee, but is disqualified if he must set that fee).
45. Callaham v. Childers, 186 Okla. 504, 99 P. (2d) 126 (1940); Vine v. Jones, 13 S, D.
54, 82 N. W. 82 (1900); Tharp v. Massengill, 38 N. M. 58, 28 P. (2d) 502 (1933).
46. Ex parte Bowles, 164 Md. 318, 165 Atl. 169 (1933) (son). It was held not to dis-
qualify when a judge had given legal advice to an attorney brother-in-law in a case before
him, Ewing v. Haas, 132 Va. 215, 111 S. E. 255 (1922). For a note showing that in a number
of jurisdictions the judge is not disqualified if the party is a relative and does not receive a
contingent fee, see Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 1325.
47. Compare Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Kirk, 102 Miss. 41, 58 So. 710 (1912) with Nor-
wich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 121 Miss. 510, 83 So. 676 (1920).
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The problem of attorney relationship is further refined by introduc-
ing a distinction between cases where the relative personally partici-
pates and those where he is merely associated with a law firm appearing
before the judge. The latter situation was recently denied as ground
for a retrial by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on the theory that
the trial judge had in no way abused his statutory discretion. The
Court, however, noted that the question had not been raised until after
the trial had been in progress for nine days, and remarked that the
judge would doubtless have disqualified himself had he sooner been
aware of the plaintiff's objection to his sitting.43
There is an increasing tendency in the Supreme Court for Justices to
disqualify themselves in cases argued by relatives. Solicitor General
Hughes resigned when his father took office and Chief Justice Stone
would hear argument by his son only upon the consent of the parties.42
Nineteenth century practice appears to have been less strict. Appar-
entiy no objections were made to the practice of Justices Curtis 1 and
Field "' who, on various occasions, sat in cases presented by their re-
spective brothers. Similarly, Justice Miller heard his brother-in-law
and close friend, W. P. Ballinger, in at least two cases. 52
It is quite possible that at least in those jurisdictions where judges
48. Voltmann v. United Fruit Co., 147 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) (Eon-in-law).
Cf. Boyer v. Backus, 282 Mich. 701, 280 N. W. 756 (1938) in which the judge vas not dis-
qualified for several reasons where a first cousin was a member of the firm presenting the
case.
49. Ex parle Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 5 (1942). As the text indicates, styles shift in pro-
priety. For example, the Supreme Court Reporter used to practice before the Court. Biuo-
ANCE, JEREmAH SULLIVAN BLACK (1934) c. 18, 19. Reporter Howard put an advertisement
in the first volume of his own reports: "The Reporter avails himself of this opportunity to
tender his professional services, in arguing causes before the Supreme Court.... The daily
presence of the Reporter in court will ensure his attention to any cases that may be con-
fided to him." 1 How. v (U. S. 1843-T. & J. W. Johnson, pub., Phila.; not in other edi-
tions). As further example of changing notions of propriety, compare Mr. Justice Jack-son's
participation in the Nuremberg Trial with Chief Justice Stone's refusal, as incompatible
with his responsibilities as a Justice, to accept the chairmanship of an atomic energy com-
mission. Stone said, "As I am already committed to the former, it is clear to me that I could
not rightly undertake the latter." Letter, Stone to Senator Vandenberg, 91 Co\.G. REc.
8951 (1945). And see Powell, Harlan F. Stone (1946) 94 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 355, 357. See
also letter of refusal of Mr. Justice Cardozo while Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals to accept membership in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague: "After
many inward struggles I have come to the conclusion that a Judge of the Court of Appeals
best serves the people of the State by refusirig to assume an obligation that in indeterminate,
if improbable, contingencies might take precedence of the obligations attached to his judicial
office." N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1927, p. 16, quoted in FRA FURTER AND SamLu Lx, CASES
ON FDEA. JURISDICTION (Rev. Ed. 1937) 12 n. 3.
50. Scottv. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U.S. 1857).
51. Ex pare Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S.
1867); en parke McCardle, 6 Wall. 318 (U. S. 1868).
52. Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341 (1878); Cowdrey v. Galveston, H., & H.
R. R., 93 U. S. 352 (1877).
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are plentiful and cases may be conveniently transferred from one
docket to another the attorney-judge relationship will be increasingly
considered a basis for disqualification. Opinions of New York Bar As-
sociations, 53 as well as a recent Delaware incident, 4 foreshadow such a
trend in state courts. That the same may be true of federal courts is
indicated by a resolution of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges in 1942."5
Bias. Disqualification for bias represents a complete departure from
53. Opinion No. 346 of the Committee on Professional Ethics, N. Y. County Lawyers
Ass'n, reported N. Y. COUNTY LAWYERS ASS'N YEAR Booic (1938) 160-1, puts these two
questions: Is it proper for a judge to sit at a trial (a) where a near relative is an attorney for a
party? (b) where a near relative is in the employ' of an attorney for a party? The committee
denied the right to sit in the first case and said that the second "depends on the facts in each
particular case." The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, confronted with two
similar questions in its opinion No. 136, May 4,1938, answered question (a) as did the County
Bar Association, and replied to a similar question (b) that the judge should "strain every
effort" to avoid sitting. The City Bar noted its agreement in No. 136 with opinion 346 of
the County Bar. (Letter of Forrest S. Drummond, Ass't Librarian, Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N. Y., to author August 13, 1946.)
54. In 1945 Governor Walter W. Bacon of Delaware nominated Chief Justice Daniel J.
Layton for reappointment. Critics of the appointment, led by former Federal Judge Hugh
M. Morris, opposed confirmation, contending that Layton had two sons and a brother prac-
ticing law in Delaware and that he had sat in cases presented by them. Judge Morris as-
serted that in no state but Delaware was such practice tolerated and he also contended that
the A. B. A. Canons of Judicial Ethics "unequivocally disqualify a judge from sitting (either
alone or with other judges) in any case in which his son, brother, or other near relative is
attorney for a party to the cause." Chief Justice Layton was supported by the State Attor-
ney General and two past Attorneys General. The nomination was withdrawn by the Gov-
ernor when it became apparent that it could not be confirmed. Wilmington (Del.) Morning
News, Aug. 14, 1945, and Wilmington Journal,,Aug. 17 and 18, 1945. The quoted passage
is from the Journal of August 18.
The A. B. A. Canon 13, to which reference was made, forbids judges to sit where a near
relative is a party, and provides further that "he should not suffer his conduct to justify the
impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that
he is affected by the kinship, rank, position, or influence of any party or other person."
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Emics, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETnics, ADOPTED BY TIIE AMER-
ICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1937) 31. As originally proposed to the American Bar Association
this Canon specifically provided as follows: ". . . if such a course can reasonably be avoided,
he should not sit in litigation where a near relative appears before him as counsel . . "
but this clause was stricken on motion of Mr. Charles A. Boston for the Committee on Ju-
dicial Ethics on the ground that it did not conform with practice in some states. 49 A. B. A.
REP. (1924) 66-7.
In Opinion No. 200, involving the propriety of a judge hearing an attorney relative, the
Committee on Judicial Ethics held that Canon 13 does not "preclude" his sitting but that
it would be "wise" for a judge to withdraw. ,(1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 234.
55. See The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 817; 820.
The resolution adopted by the judges began as follows: "That it is the sense of the Confer-
ence that federal judges should avoid sitting in cases in which their near relatives are of
counsel, as contrary to the spirit of Canon 13 of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar
Association. . . ." Certainly the modern trend in at least some Federal Courts is to go very
far to avoid any contact with cases in which judges have any connection with counsel. For
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common law principles. Despite Blackstone's denial that bias could
exist as a ground for disqualification a more recent humility has
prompted recognition that human judges may deny justice not only
for profit or to benefit a kinsman, but for less tangible prejudices for or
against a party, a lawyer, or a cause.
Although in many states a party cannot charge "bias" and thereby
have another judge assigned to hear a case,r" the development is toward
that end in the trial courts. This tendency is exemplified by the in-
creasing popularity of two basic statutory devices. The first is an ex-
tension of the usual statutory grounds for disqualification to include
additional situation§ where, in the opinion of the legislature, a likeli-
hood of judicial partiality exists. The second is in the form of disquali-
fication by affidavit, which amounts simply to mandatory change of
example, Mr. Samuel Clark of Washington, D. C. was from 1939 to 1946 the United States
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division. During that period his brother,
Judge Charles E. Clark of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, avoided hearing any De-
partment of Justice tax cases whether or not orally presented by the Assistant Attorney
General. The signature of the Assistant Attorney General on briefs, though frequently
purely formal, was thought to be disqualifying.
A somewhat similar situation arises when a judge has a relative on a lower court or
administrative agency whose decision is being reviewed. In all cases involving the Federal
Communications Commission Justice Black has disqualified because his brother-in-law,
Mr. Clifford Durr, is a member of the Commission. See, e.g., FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 67 Sup.
Ct. 213 (U. S. 1946). However Judge Learned Hand considered it appropriate to review
decisions of his cousin, Judge Augustus Hand, when the former was a circuit judge and the
latter a district judge. See, e.g., New York & Albany Lighterage Co. v. Bowers, 4 F. (2d) 604
(S. D. N. Y. 1925), aff'd, 10 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
56. Hutchinson v. Manchester St. Ry., 73 N. H. 271, 60 Ad. 1011 (1905). Clymav.
Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 Ad. 539 (1894) (where justice of peace issued varrant for arrest
of newspaper man who slandered the arresting justice, tried, and sentenced him; held "in-
decorous and unwise"-but not reversible); In re Hague, 103 N. J. Eq. 505, 143 Ad. 836
(Ch. 1928); County Commissioners v. Wilmer, 131 Md. 175, 101 Ad. 686 (1917); Boswell v.
Flockheart, 8 Leigh 364 (Va. 1837); Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 193 So. 452 (1940).
Trial judges may be given particularly wide discretion in bias cases, King v. Grace, 293
Mass. 244, 200 N. E. 346 (1936); Batchelder v. Nourse, 35 Vt. 642, 643 (1863) (where the
upper court found itself powerless over the trial judge "if neither taste nor sense is operative
and effectual to restrain him from such an impropriety.") But compare Leonard v. Willcox,
101 Vt. 195, 142 Ad. 762 (1928) for a comprehensive statement of the modern Vermont
view. Cf. Appeal of Askounes, 144 Pa. Super. 293, 19 A. (2d) 846 (1941).
Frequently, as noted above, the statutes do not contain a general disqualification for
bias as an abstraction as distinguished from specific types of bias, and in jurisdictions of this
type bias and prejudice are not generally grounds for disqualification unless of a sort named
in the statutes. Galveston & Houston Inv. Co. v. Grymes, 94 Tem. 609, 64 S. \V. 778 (1901);
State v. Flynn, 31 Ark. 35 (1876).
Cases recognizing disqualification for bias are State ex rel. McAllister v. Slate, 278 Mo.
570, 581, 214 S. W. 85, 88 (1919); State ex rel. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. v. Clancy, 30
Mont. 529, 77 Pac. 312 (1904); Moore v. O'Dell, 16 Ohio 0. 460 (C. P. 1939), where change
of venue was allowed when judge refused to allow party to file a pleading on the ground that
he had no sound case. Modern English law recognizes this disqualification. Frome United
Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices [1926] App. Cas. 586.
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venue at the request of either party. Affidavit statutes sometimes re-
quire the party requesting the change to establish grounds indicating
bias, while in others a simple affidavit without supporting evidence is
sufficient to effect a transfer of the case.17 Although some affidavit"statutes have been held unconstitutional as encroachments upon judi-
cial power, 18 they are generally accepted without question. 1
The more significant situations involving possibility of judicial' bias
may, for convenience of analysis, be classified into those arising from
the judge's "attorney contacts," his "party contacts" and his "govern-
ment contacts." 60 Although the judge's relationship with his former law
partners is logically a part of the first category, the public interest stim-
57. Examples of automatic disqualification statutes in operation are Davis v. Irwin, 65
Idaho 77, 139 P. (2d) 474 (1943); Stephens v. Stephens, 17 Ariz. 306, 152 Pac. 164 (1915);
State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N. M. 73, 28 P. (2d) 511 (1933). Cases holding that some
showing of bias must be made even with affidavit type statutes are Crowley, Milner & Co. v.
Reid, 239 Mich. 605, 215 N. W. 29 (1927); People v. Emmett, 123 Cal. App. 678, 12 P. (2d)
92 (1932); Nelson v. Hoskinson, 106 Kan. 601, 189 Pac. 165 (1920); Foley v. Utterback, 196
Iowa 956, 195 N. W. 721 (1923). For an excellent analysis of the affidavit statutes in terms
of their various degrees of imperiousness see Note (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 169.
58. Diehl v. Crump, 72 Okla. 108, 179 Pac. 4 (1919); Austin v. Lambert, 11 Cal. (2d)
73, 77 P. (2d) 849 (1938); Notes (1920) 5 A. L. R. 1275, (1938) 115 A. L. R. 855.
59. U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac. 1074 (1926); Berger v. United States, 255
U. S. 22 (1921), assuming the validity of the 1911 Act of Congress providing for use of
affidavits, 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 25 (1940); (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 1118.
60. There are, of course, other situations involving disqualification for bias. For some
of the many examples: where judge on first trial expresses opinion defendant is guilty, judge
is disqualified on second trial, State v. Atterbery, 134 S. C. 392, 133 S. E. 101 (1926); and
premature indication of decision was disqualifying in Wendel v. Hughes, 64 Ohio App. 310,
28 N. E. (2d) 686 (1940). Contra: Jones v. State, 61 Ark. 88, 32 S. W. 81 (1895). Strongly
opinionated remarks in passing sentence at a previous trial of the same case, Kolowich v.
Ferguson, 264 Mich. 668, 250 N. W. 875 (1933), or participation in early stage of case as one
man grand jury, People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N. W. (2d) 466 (1943), were both
held not to disqualify.
Needless to say, the judge should not practice in his own court, Cady v. Lang, 95 Vt.
287, 115 Atl. 140 (1921), and see Professional Ethics Committee Op. No. 2 (1942) 28 A. B.
A. J. 626; and it is preferable that he not be a witness before himself, Burlington Ins. Co. v.
McLeod, 40 Kan. 54, 19 Pac. 354 (1888); People v. Connors, 77 Cal. App. 438, 246 Pac. 1072
(1926). For early firm expression of an opposite view, see remark of Sir John Hawles, Solici-
tor General, on Cornish's trial, 11 How. St. Tr. 455, 459 (ca. 1688). Compare Steerforth, In
Dic.cnNs, DAVID COPPERFIELD: ". . . and you shall find the judge in the nautical case, the
advocate in the clergyman's case, or counterwise. They are like actors; now a man's judge,
andnowheisnotajudge; . . ."
A special problem arises in connection with punishment of contempt of the judge in
open court. The almost universal rule is that the judge can hear such cases; See Note
(1928) 52 A. L. R. 1291; but cf. Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517 (1925); and see Poff v.
Scales, 36 Idaho 762, 213 Pac. 1019 (1923) (holding that a judge sued for damages for having
punished plaintiff for contempt cannot sit in the damage case).
One type of bias has been held to be so serious that its presence results in violation of the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment. If a judge receives a portion of a fine which he
levies, the trial is invalid, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927); but cf. State v. Schelton, 205
Ind. 416, 186 N. E. 772 (1933), which attempts to distinguish away the Tumey holding.
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ulated by the Jackson-Black controversy has made its separate con-
sideration in a later section seem desirable.
A judge, of course, is often closely associated with attorneys not in
the ex-partner class. Close friendships formed at the bar with other
practitioners naturally outlive elevation to the bench.61 And, pre-
sumably, if the ex-practitioner judge is intimate with former partners,
the ex-teacher judge is equally intimate with former faculty colleagues.
The ex-law clerk occupies a position not unlike that of the former junior
associate, and an even closer association is found where a judge resigns
from the bench and later appears before his former judicial colleagues.
None of these grounds, however, is usually considered sufficient to
warrant disqualification. For example, Justice Frankfurter does not
disqualify himself When his former Harvard colleague and good friend,
Paul Freund is of counsel,6 2 nor does Justice Douglas decline to sit
when he finds the names of his old Yale associates Thurman Arnold,
Abe Fortas, and Walton Hamilton on briefs.13 Moreover, Justice Rut-
ledge has frequently heard oral arguments by Ralph Fuchs, a former
associate at Washington University." Indeed, no one has ever sug-
gested the desirability of disqualification in such instances.
In the United States Supreme Court ex-law clerks are barred from
appearing before the Court for twvo years after they leave the employ
of the Justices, a rule which suggests that the prejudicial effects of close
association wear off rather quickly. 5 Few other courts limit in any
way the practice of ex-law clerks.c"
The ex-judge may well be the most intimate with the court of any of
the "ex's", for his association has been not merely with one judge but
with the group. Thus on the theory that association breeds intimacy
61. The American Bar Association explicitly recommends that the judge not withdraw
into his shell after appointment. See Judi&al Canon No. 33, CAxNons, op. cit. supra note 54,
at38.
62. Muschany v. United States, 324 U. S. 49 (1945).
63. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., No. 27, Oct. Term 1946, is the most
recent example of an Arnold and Fortas case in the Supreme Court. In patent--anti-trust
litigation Professor Hamilton is probably the most effective attorney whose briefs are regu-
larly before the Court. See Mlercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U. S. 661
(1944), in which Professor Hamilton was of counsel amicus curiae, and Special Equip. Co.
v. Coe, 324 U. S. 370, 380 (1945), in which Professor Hamilton was not of counsel.
64. Professor Fuchs, until recently in the office of the Solicitor General of the United
States, and presently Professor of Law at Indiana University, appeared in numerous cases
in the 1944 and 1945 terms of the Supreme Court. His most recent United States Supreme
Court case is United Public Workers v. Mitchell, No. 20, Oct. Term 1946.
65. SUP. CT. R. 3, 11 U. S. Sup. CT. REP. DG. (1939) 6. The Supreme Court Rule,
however, suggests a method for avoiding some of the results of a too-free disqualification of
Justices. Rather than postpone decision of cases, it may be preferable to disqualify the
counsel.
66. The Inquiry shows that only two of the state and one of the federal courts have
any practice of disqualification in cases of esx-clerks.
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and intimacy breeds influence, argument by a former judge might dis-
qualify an entire bench. But the notion has never been pushed to that
extreme and in the United States Supreme Court, for example, ex-
Justices Curtis, Campbell, and Hughes often appeared before their
former colleagues. 7
The most difficult situation, and one which permits no rule of thumb,
is disqualification in cases argued by an intimate personal friend. All
judges have close friends at the bar, and perhaps on rare occasions a
judge might be swayed in his decision by the presence of such a friend
in court. Nevertheless the overwhelming American practice is against
disqualification for this reason, although occasionally a judge does feel
bound to disqualify himself. Judicial response to the Inquiry indicates
that in almost half the states and federal circuits- there is occasional
disqualification for the reason of intimate friendship with counsel. 8
It is, for example, well-known that Judges Learned Hand and Jerome
Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals avoid sitting in cases
presented by certain close friends.
A second possible source of bias is the judge's "party contact." The
propriety of a judge's sitting on a case involving a former client
seems to .depend upon whether or not the case in question was in his
office prior to his going on the bench. When the judge has had prior
contact with both the client and the case, disqualification is universal
for the obvious, but seldom articulated, reason that a judge would
seldom have an open mind under such circumstances, and to sit would
invite charges of corruption." But where the judge's firm has been re-
tained subsequent to his elevation to the bench a closer question is
presented. Reference to current practice discloses a dominant view
that judges should not disqualify under such circumstances, but it is
reasonable to suppose that the practice in any given situation may
67. Curtis is recorded as having argued 46 cases before his former colleagues, 5 Liwis,
GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS (1908) 450-1. Campbell's most famous argument was in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall, 36 (U. S. 1873). Some of Hughes' cases are Harriman Nat,
Bank v. Seldomridge, 249 U. S. 1 (1919); United States v. Los Angeles R. R., 273 U. S. 299
(1927); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392 (1927); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v.
P. Lorillard Co., 273 U. S. 629 (1927). No one can say that Hughes had undue influence with
his brothers-he lost the last three cases cited.
One writer has suggested that when elective trial judges are turned out of office, they
may have a very difficult time re-establishing themselves at the bar. To alleviate this condi-
tion he proposed that Cook County trial judges specialize in particular matters while on the
bench so that the training thus acquired would give them a base for practice. Note, THE
POSITION OF THE EX-JUDGE (1913) 8 ILL. L. REV. 331. The Inquiry shows it to be general
practice in state and federal courts for ex-judges to appear before their former associates.
68. A more obvious 'case arises where the party is a close friend of long standing and
rather publicly claims influence; disqualified in such circumstances in Callahan v. Callahan,
30 Idaho 431, 165 Pac. 1122 (1917); Cottle v. Cottle [1939] 2 All E. R. 535.
69. Typical statutes are N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) § 2:26-193; CAL. CODE CIV. Pao,
(Deering, 1937) § 170(4); REv. STAT. WASH. (Rem., 1932) § 54.4.
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depend upon the nature of the case and closeness of relationship with
the client.10 Despite the opinion of the late Chief Justice Stone that
disqualification in cases involving former clients is desirable,71 the
practice of Supreme Court Justices has been to sit in such cases. Justice
Roberts, for example, was a director of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company and counsel for the Pennsylvania Railroad before
his appointment to the Court, but subsequently participated in de-
cisions involving both.72 Similarly, Justices Lurton and Van Devanter
occasionally passed judgment on their former clients.73
A judge's former "government contacts" present a third possibility
of grounds for bias. The young lawyer with political ambitions follows
a familiar path to fame: a prosecuting attorney to begin with, election
to the legislature or Congress, perhaps a stopover in the executive
branch of the state or federal government, and finally a judgeship.
The present Supreme Court affords several examples. Chief Justice
Vinson has served in both the executive and legislative branches of
government. Justices Burton and Black were Senators, and Justices
Reed, Murphy and Jackson have held executive positions, including
variously the Solicitor Generalship and the Attorney Generalship.
Justice Douglas headed the Securities and Exchange Commission, while
Justice Frankfurter was once an assistant United States Attorney.
Only Justice Rutledge held no previous federal non-judicial post. It is,
of course, possible that any of these past experiences may influence the
judge in a case involving personalities and problems with which he has
had prior contact.
A judge might disqualify himself for bias because of his government
70. The Inquiry shows that disqualification is universal in cases which were in the
judge's office when he left practice. Where the case involves a former client but the par-
ticular matter was not in the office when the judge went on the bench, the Inquiry shows that
in about three-fourths of the State and Federal Courts, the judge does not disqualify.
The statutes are usually construed extremely strictly against disqualification. Black-
burn v. Craufurd, 22 Md. 447 (1863) (judge could sit where only "some of" the issues were
similar to those in his prior case as attorney); and see Stevens v. Hall, 8 Idaho 549, 69 Pac.
282 (1902); Trinkle v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. Rep. 257, 127 S. W. 1060 (1910). Disqualification
is usually sharply limited to "the same matter." Stewart v. Mix, 30 La. Ann. 1036 (1878).
California has absolute disqualification for two years in any case of any kind brought by a
former client, CAL. CODE Crv. PRO. (Deering, 1937) § 170(4).
71. See note 121 infra.
72. American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232 (1936); Georgia v. Pa.
R. R., 324 U. S. 439 (1945).
73. Lurton was attorney for the railroad in Louisville & N. R. R. v. Campbell & Rich-
ards, 54 Tenn. 254 (1872); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Gardner, 69 Tenn. 6S8 (1878). On the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme
Court, he heard a number of cases involving that Company. See MYERS, HemrORy OF TnE
SUPREME COURT (1912) 718 et seg. Van Devanter represented the Union Pacific in many
cases collected by Myers, id. at 769, and sat, for example, in Union Pacific R. R. v. Hadley,
246 U. S. 330 (1918).
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experience (1) if he participated personally as a government lawyer
in the case under consideration; (2) if the case is presented by his for-
mer government associates; (3) if he participated in formulating the
policy which the case involves; and (4) if he is a former legislator and
the case involves construction of a statute he supported.
That the same man should not assume the roles of prosecutor and
judge at different hearings of the same case needs hardly to be said.
The impropriety is obvious, and prosecutors who become judges almost
invariably disqualify themselves in these situations. The case of the
Tennessee prosecutor who, after his election as trial judge, sat on the
retrial of an action originally instituted by him is exceptional, and
reversal in that casd was swift.74 But there is no impropriety where
the judge's role as prosecutor has been largely formal, as in the case
of Attorneys General, who have only theoretical responsibility for
minor cases in their departments. Thus, although the Schneiderman
denaturalization case 11 was in the Department of Justice during Jus-
tice Murphy's tenure of office as Attorney General, he presumably had
no direct connection with it and felt free to vote against the Depart-
ment he had formerly headed. On the other hand, Justice Jackson,
who succeeded Murphy as Attorney General, felt sufficiently involved
in the same case to disqualify himself. But Justice Jackson, too, has,
on other occasions, recognized that his previous contact with a matter
was too slight to be prejudicial. Although as Attorney General he
decided not to institute litigation concerning coverage of the insurance
industry by the anti-trust laws, he nevertheless felt free to participate
in the decision of a subsequent action on the subject begun by his
successor, Mr. Biddle.76
Supreme Court Justices have not hesitated to hear their former gov-
ernment colleagues. Again current examples are furnished by the prac-
tice of Justices Murphy and Jackson who regularly sit on cases pre-
sented by their former associates in the Justice Department." Although
74. Wilson v. State, 153 Tenn. 206, 281 S. W. 151 (1926). See also State v. Cottrell, 45
W. Va. 837, 32 S. E. 162 (1899); Fisher v. State, 206 Ark. 177, 174 S. W. (2d) 446 (1943).
But in Eastridge v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 126, 241 S. W. 806 (1922) the judge was not
disqualified although he had signed the indictment as commonwealth attorney.
75. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,807 (1943).
76. United States v. South-eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944). Chief
Justice Stone also recognized that an Attorney General's contact with a case might be so
formal as not to require disqualification. See note 121 infra. Chief Justice Taney made an
odd compromise in Bank of the United States v. United States, 2 How. 711 (U. S. 1844). As
Attorney General he had given the Secretary of Treasury an opinion on the subject of the
case. He did not sit in the case, but filed in the appendix of Howard's Reports an opinion
which is an unofficial dissent. 2 How. 745 (U. S. 1844).
77. An example is Mr. Samuel Clark who served as an Assistant Attorney General with
both Murphy and Jackson and frequently appeared before them after they went on Court.
A recent instance is Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945).
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Supreme Court practice in this respect has evoked no criticism, there
is a minority view in the state and circuit courts which regards presence
on the bench as inappropriate under such circumstances. As the In-
quiry shows, the problem appears to have arisen in only about half the
state and federal courts polled.
When a judge has been involved with a case or its underlying policy
in a capacity other than that of prosecutor there is precedent in the
United States Supreme Court for the view that he may sit. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court in Marbury v. Madison 78
although he was the Secretary of State who had failed to deliver the
papers in question, and Chief Justice Chase voted to invalidate the
legal tender laws which were the basis of his own fiscal policy as Secre-
tary of the Treasury. 9 But responses to the Inquiry indicate that many
state judges take a different view.
The ex-legislator as state judge may occasionally pause to consider
whether he may interpret statutes he supported in his former capacity,
but federal judges have no hesitation in participating under similar
circumstances. s0 An explanation for this divergency in practice may
be found in the fact that federal judges are so regularly appointed from
Congress that disqualification for this reason might paralyze the entire
judicial machinery. Three members of the present Supreme Court are
ex-congressmen, and 25 out of the 75 appointed prior to 1937 had
served in the legislative branch."' So far as is known, Supreme Court
Justices have never disqualified on this ground, and other federal judges
have very seldom done so. State judges, on the other hand, are more
nearly divided as to the proper practice. 'While this problem has not
arisen in a majority of the states responding to the Inquiry, there is a
variance of views in those in which it has.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the Supreme Court
is less inclined to disqualification than some of the state courts. In an
appreciable minority of states judges disqualify themselves if a case is
presented by a former government associate, if a judge participated in
formulating the policy involved in a case, or if a judge is a former mem-
78. 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
79. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1870); Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457
(U. S. 1871).
80. In the Jewell Ridge case, the motion for rehearing on the ground that Mr. Justice
Black was disqualified included as a ground in addition to his former association with Mr.
Harris that Black had been Senator-sponsor of the Fair Labor Standards Act. However,
this point has been given no subsequent attention. In one of the few cases on this or a re-
lated point, it was held that a judge who as an attorney had drafted the ordinance involved
in a case was not disqualified. .Ex pare Largent, 144 Tem. Cr. Rep. 592, 162 S. W. (2d) 419
(1942), rev'd on other grounds, 318 U. S. 418 (1943).
81. Thirty-seven of the seventy-five had been members of state legislatures and thirty-
one had previously held federal administrative positions, usually cabinet. EvWNG, TnE
JUDGES OF =E SuPRE E CoUT, 1789-1937 (1938) 84 et see.
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ber of the legislature which passed a statute n6w presented for judicial
consideration. Yet the Supreme Court practice appears invariably to
the contrary. Similarly, no case is known in which a Supreme Court
Justice has disqualified himself because an intimate friend presented
the argument, although in almost half the states responding to the
Inquiry at least occasional disqualification occurs for this reason.
Explanation for this discrepancy may be found in the impossibility
of obtaining substitutes for Supreme Court Justices and the impoitance
of having issues of national consequerce determined by the full Court
whenever possible. If disqualification came too easily and Justices fre-
quently declined to sit, the entire federal judicial machinery might be
seriously handicapped.
Within the past five years three instances have arisen which serve to
dramatize the result of numerous disqualifications. A statute provides
that six Justices are required for a quorum of the Court,12 and in three
recent cases (or groups of cases) disqualification by four Justices re-
sulted in a loss of that quorum and made it impossible for the Court to
act.83 Since one of these cases was a crucial anti-trust case and another
involved the constitutionality of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act, a serious impasse resulted. Several bills were introduced in Con-
gress attempting to solve the problem by reducing the quorum from
six to five, by calling upon a retired Justice to sit in the emergency, or
by some combination of these devices.84 Congress, however, was unable
to agree on any of these proposals, and the bill finally adopted disposed
only of the antitrust case by referring it to the Second Circuit for deci-
sion. Chief Justice Stone broke the deadlock in the Holding Company
case by withdrawing his disqualification, but the third case had to be
dismissed for lack of a quorum.
STATUTORY DISQUALIFICATION OF DISTRICT JUDGES
The two basic federal disqualification statutes, Sections 20 and 21 of
the Judicial Code,85 apply only to the practice of district courts. Sec-
82. 36 STAT. 1152 (1911), 28 U.S. C. § 321 (1940).
83. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, dismissed for lack of quorum, 314 U. S. 583
(1941); North American Co. v. SEC, finally decided April 1, 1946, 327 U. S. 686; SEC v.
Engineers Public Service Co., Nos. 1 and 2 at the present term, having been first argued
Nov. 15 and 16, 1945, 14 U. S. L. WEEK 3190, continued in May, 1946, for lack of a quorum,
14 U. S. L. WEEK 3405; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, transferred 322 U. S.
716 (1944) and decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 148 F. (2d) 416 (1945).
84. H. R. 2808 and S. 1135 (identical) reduced the quorum to five; 1H. R. 2926 reduced
the quorum to five and provided for calling upon a retired Justice if the quorum of five could
not be obtained; H. R. 3456 left the quorum unchanged and provided for calling a retired
Justice. All four were in the 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). For general discussion of the
quorum problem and of proposals to meet it, see Cunningham, The Problem of the Supreme
Court Quorum (1944) 12 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 175.,
The anti-trust case was transferred to tlie Second Circuit Court of Appeals by H. R.
3054, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944), 58 STAT. 272 (1944), amending 32 STAT. 823 (1903), 15
U. S. C. § 29 (1940).
85. 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S. C. §§ 24-5 (1940).
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tion 20, dating from 1792, permits disqualification, if requested by a
party, on four separate grounds: (1) interest; (2) previous representa-
tion of a party; (3) prospective participation in the case as a material
witness; and (4) relationship or connection with a party. But none of
the above situations presents an absolute ground for disqualification.
A judge must disqualify himself only if circumstances will "render it
improper, in his opinion" to sit, and his determination is reviewable,
if at all, only for abuse of discretion.,'
Although for one hundred and twenty years Section 20 remained the
only important federal law on disqualification s7 its operative effect
was sharply confined by judicial construction. Direct reference was
made to the English common law for definition of "interest," c and
this rationale restrictively applied to new fact situations.3 "Has been
of counsel" was soon limited by addition of the phrase "in this case,"
and an attorney-client relationship prior to the case in dispute was
never considered by itself sufficiently prejudicial to require disqualifi-
cation." Disqualification of a judge on the ground that he was a ma-
terial witness was confined to situations where the party could find no
86. The question of capacity to review has sometimes gone by unnoticed, Carr v. Fife,
156 U. S. 494 (1895); Epstein v. United States, 196 Fed. 354 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912), but when
squarely faced has been held to be outside the power of an appellate court, Coltrane v.
Templeton, 106 Fed. 370 (C. C. A. 4th, 1901).
87. A less important statute is 36 STAT. 1132 (1911), 28 U.S. C. § 216 (1940) providing
that no judge who hears a case in the trial court shall pass upon the same case in the Circuit
Court of Appeals. This section, which originated in § 4, of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1
STAT. 75 (1789), is applied in Cramp & Sons Co. v. International Curtiss Co., 228 U. S. 645
(1913); and state and federal cases on judges rehearing their former cases either on appeal or
new trial are collected in Note (1913) 57 L. Ed. 1003.
Supreme Court Justices are not bound by the federal statute, but practice early devel-
oped whereby Justices who had heard a case on circuit would participate only where their
presence was necessary for a clear majority decision on the appeal. In Talbot v. Janson, 3
Dall. 133, 168 (U. S. 1795), Mr. Justice Wilson disqualified because he had sat below and
noted that the unanimity of sentiment among his brethren made it unnecessary for him to
sit. See also Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796). At a later date it appears to
have been customary for the Supreme Court Justices to hear cases both on trial and on
appeal. In the case of Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (U. S. 1852), Mr. Justice Nelson
tried the case and also sat on the appeal. Pending the appeal he also gave informal expres-
sion of his views on the underlying problem in litigation to a member of Congress who re-
layed it to the House of Representatives. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. (1856) 663.
88. Spencerv. Lapsley, 20 How. 264, 266 (U.S. 1857).
89. For e.'mmple, the creditor of a bankrupt could sit in bankruptcy prceedings, In re
Sime, 22 Fed. Cas. 145, No. 12,860 (C. C. D. Cal. 1872); that the judge was a county tax-
payer did not disqualify him in a case involving the county, Wade v. Travis County, 72
Fed. 985 (C. C. W%. D. Te.'. 1896); only a party to litigation could complain o' the judge's
interest, In re Milwaukee & Sawyer Bldg. Corp., 79 F. 2d 478 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935). In one
of the wisest of the cases it was recognized that where a series of interrelated suits are pend-
ing and that a judge has a substantial interest in one of them, he should not sit in any. In re
Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 Fed. 348 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
90. Carr v. Fife, 156 U. S. 494 (1895). Duncan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 223 Fed.
446 (S. D. Ga. 1915) contains citations of federal and analogous state cases.
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adequate substitute,9' and the proximity of relationship required was
held to be measured by the law of the state in which the court sat."2
A statute so limited was not enough. The extreme discretion left in
the trial judge, the narrow grounds for disqualification, and the com-
plete lack of disqualification for bias were obvious shortcomings. Hence
when the Judicial Code was under consideration in 1911, Representa-
tives Cullop of Indiana and Sherley of Kentucky jointly persuaded
Congress to add Section 21, the most significant federal disqualification
statute now in force. Modeled directly upon the Indiana practice with
which Cullop was familiar, and revised on the floor of the House, Sec-
tion 21 was intended to fill the need for a federal change of venue
statute."
Thus disqualification for bias and prejudice, excluded from the com-
mon law by Blackstone, finally found its way into the federal system in
1911. The statute provides that whenever a party files an affkdavit
affirming that the trial judge has a "personal bias or prejudice" against
him or in favor of the opposing party, a new judge shall be appointed in
a specified manner. The affidavit, however, must state facts and res-
sons to substantiate the belief that prejudice exists, and it must carry a
certificate of counsel that it is made in good faith. A party is limited to
one affidavit in a case and must file it within a prescribed time.
The most serious question arising under the new statute was whether
the trial judge 14 should pass upon the truth of the charges against his
own qualification, or should automatically disqualify himself when the
affidavit raising the issue complied with the statutory requirements.
Initial doubts as to whether the statute was to be broadly or narrowly
construed 11 were set at rest by .Berger v. United States.0 The defend-
ants in that case, charged with espionage, alleged that District Judge
Landis was so biased against German-Americans as to preclude possi-
bility of a fair trial. Judge Landis' phrase that "One must have a very
91. Borgia v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cerl. denied, 296 U. S.
615 (1935).
92. In re Eatonton Elec. Co., 120 Fed. 1010 (S. D. Ga. 1903); ef. In re Fox West Coast
Theaters, 88 F. (2d) 212, 226 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), holding a son-in.law shareholder and
corporate officer not a relative for this purpose since a shareholder is not technically a
"party."
93. The Cullop Amendment was proposed generally and disc'ussed in the 61st Cong.,
3rd Sess., 46 CqNG. REC. 305-7 (1910), and passed the House after further discussion, id.
at 2626-2630. The House amendment was accepted with slight modification in conference.
The present Indiana change of venue statute governing criminal cases is very similar to the
federal statute, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1316 el seq.
94. The act does not apply to appellate judges. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co.,
213 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 1st, 1914).
95. Exparte N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. 978 (M. D. Ala. 1912), broadly hinted that
the Act would be unconstitutional unless closely confined; and EX paric American Steel
Barrel Co., 230 U. S. 35,43 (1913) suggested that the Act would be rarely used.
96. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
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judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German-Ameri-
cans in this country" 91 lent considerable support to the claim. A major-
ity of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge could do no more
than make sure that the affidavit was "legally sufficient," in compliance
with the statute, and that its factual assertions were not frivolous.
Under no circumstances, the Court continued, should the trial judge
pass on the truth or falsity of the charges; perjury statutes and disbar-
ment proceedings were sufficient safeguards against abuse of the privi-
lege.
The Berger decision, therefore, gave full breadth to the legislative
intent behind the statute. Indeed, one may be more than a little
shocked by the realization that for over a century of our history there
was no statute which would make such evident bias a ground for judi-
cial disqualification. But the clear Berger decision, the clear statute,
and its clear legislative history have not been followed in practice, and
federal trial practice still does not provide a litigant with the automatic
change of venue to which he is apparently entitled upon filing an affi-
davit in good faith.
Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow
construction of the phrase "bias and prejudice." Affidavits are found
not "legally sufficient" on the ground that the specific acts mentioned
do not in fact indicate "bias and prejudice," a reasoning which emascu-
lates the Berger decision by transferring the point of conflict. While
lower courts do not assess the truth or falsity of the charge, a similar
result is reached by holding that even if the facts stated are true, no
"prejudice" is shown.
Examples of such evasion are numerous." In a bankruptcy proceed-
ing an affidavit was filed by the protective committee charging judicial
bias in favor of the General Electric Company, which had made a condi-
tional sale to the debtor. That the judge desired continuation of elec-
tric lines so as to prevent disaffirmance of the sale was supported by
evidence that he had told the trustee he would not allow the Commit-
tee's petition to set aside the sale; that he had requested the trustee not
to testify; and that he had turned over documentary evidence relating
to the petition to an officer of the General Electric Company without
the knowledge or consent of the committee. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held per curiam that the "District Judge satisfactorily ex-
plains" his action and had committed no sin but that of "indiscreet ex-
pressions," and hence was not disqualified." Another case held in-
97. Bergerv. United States, 255 U. S. 22,28 (1921).
98. Craven v. United States, 22 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927); Johnson v. United
States, 35 F. (2d) 355 (XV. D. Wash. 1929); United States v. Parker, 23 F. Supp. 8S0 (D.
N. J. 1938). For extended discussion of federal disqualification practice, see Notes (1928)
13 CoRe. L. Q. 454; (1931) 65 U. S. L. REv. 68.
99. Inre Lisman, 89 F. (2d) 898,899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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sufficient an affidavit which charged that a party had manipulated
matters .to have a case tried before a particular judge who had been
given financial opportunities by an associate of the party.100 Similarly,
a judge alleged to have "expressed himself in condemnatory terms of
affiant" searched the evidence and concluded that the statement made
could not "by any stretch of the imagination be considered as giving
any evidence of any personal feeling on the part of the court toward
the affiant." Although he disqualified himself as a matter of discretion,
he denied that he was compelled by the statute to do so. 101
An analysis of the cases leads to the conclusion that unless and until
the Supreme Court gives new force and effect to the Berger decision the
disqualification practice of federal district courts will remain sharply
limited. 102 While Section 21 of the Judicial Code may appear to provide
a federal change of venue statute, it has not in operation attained this
result.
JUDGES AND EX-PARTNERS
Cases in which judges come into contact with former partners can be
divided into those in which the case presented by a former partner was
in the office at the time the judge left the firm, and those in which the
case arose after the judge had severed his partnership connection. The
Jewell Ridge case falls into the second category: portal-to-portal pay
cases did not come to Justice Black's former partner until at least 16
years after dissolution of the partnership.
Judicial practice in both these situations is clear. Judges invariably
disqualify themselves when the case was in the office prior to dissolu-
tion of the partnership; 103 otherwise it is the common practice to sit
in cases argued by ex-partners. 04 Indeed, in the entire literature on
100. Benedictv. Seiberling, 17 F. (2d) 831 (N. D. Ohio 1926).
101. Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 1 F. (2d) 582, 586 (IV. D. Tenn. 1924).
102. Further limitations arise from interpretation of other passages of the statute. Hence
the prejudice must be "personal" toward a party, and the extremest bias on a "legal issue,"
as neatly disassociated from a "party," is not a ground for disqualification. In this view,
not even a prejudgment by the judge in a newspaper article is "bias," Henry v. Speer, 201
Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913). While a judge should not be disqualified for having opinions
on a legal subject, Scott v. Beams, 122 F (2d) 777, 788 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941), he ought to
retain an appearance of impartiality, for appearances are important if the litigant is not only
to receive justice, but to think that he has received justice, Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.
(2d) 596 (App. D. C. 1941); Van Schaick v. Carr, 159 Misc. Rep. 873, 289 N. Y. S. 495, 502
(Sup. Ct. 1936). Most of the federal cases cited above overlook this factor entirely. The
English cases make no such error, Cottle v. Cottle (1939) 2 All Eng. L. R. 535; Amar Singh
v. Sadhu Singh (1925) 6 Ind. L. R. Lahore 396.
103. This is not significantly different from the category of former client cases, in which
disqualification is generally required. See for example Slaven v. Wheeler, 58 Tex. 23 (1882);
but cf. Merch. Nat. Bank v. Cross, 283 S. W. 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) making an excep-
tion if the judge was merely an employee and not a member of the firm.
104. Where the judge's former law partner was attorney for plaintiff and still owed the
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disqualification, some twenty-five hundred cases and si-xty articles,
not a single instance has been found in which it is suggested that ex-
partnership, by itself, should be a ground for disqualification. 1 1 Simi-
larly, no mention of this basis is made by the American Bar Association
in its code of judicial ethics.'
If a judge is to be disqualified from hearing cases argued by a former
partner, disqualification must be founded on the theory that the previ-
ous association creates an intimacy which causes the arguments of
counsel to have excessive weight with the judge. The difficulty with
this argument, however, is that it is almost impossible to draw any
rational distinction between the relationship of a judge with a former
partner and that with a former faculty colleague, a former government
associate, a former law clerk, a former bench associate, or simply an
old friend. As has been noted above, these relationships are almost
never treated as grounds for disqualification.
The practice of Justice Holmes on the Massachusetts Supreme Court
may be taken as one measure of the attitude of a sensitive jastice in his
relations with ex-partners. A study of a dozen volumes of the Massa-
chusetts reports picked at random from the period of Holmes' tenure
shows that his principal legal associates before going on the bench,
George Shattuck and IV. A. Munroe,0 7 appeared before him no less
than nine times."x During this period it seems to have been normal
judge money, the judge was held not disqualified since there was no connection between the
case and the former partnership, Schwartz Showell Corp. v. Bonfiglio, 261 Mich. 407, 246
N. W. 162 (1933). Nebraska provides that a judge is disqualified to hear a former partner
with whom he continues to office, 2 NEB. REV. STAT. (1943) c. 24, § 24-315. Some states
provide that a judge may not maintain a partnership after going on the Bench. IDuo L, ws
ANN. (Anderson, 1943) c. 1, § 1-1804. Of course if a judge continues a partnership after he
goes on -the Bench, he cannot hear partnership cases. Coleman v. Fisher, 6S Fla. 56, 66 So.
290 (1914).
105. One of the few cases raising the problem of ex-partners is Dickenson v. Parks,
Judge, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932), where an ex-partner of the judge was to be a prin-
cipal witness for a party on an issue of fact. The adversary party alleged that the testimony
of the ex-partner would have undue weight, and also alleged that the trial judge was so
prejudiced against her that he could not give a fair trial. The combination of circumstances
required disqualification. In State ex rel. Wilcox v. Bird, 179 Okla. 594, 67 P. (2d) 966 (1937),
the combined circumstances of former partner representation and the fact that the party
was a former client was held sufficient to sustain a change of venue. An example of a similar
holding where former partnership is but one of a very complicated set of circumstances is
State v. Marshall, 123 Ohio St. 586,176 N. E.454 (1931). Cf. note 115 infra.
106. Canon 13 of the Amer. Bar Ass'n Code is perhaps the most nearly relevant. Its
brief "legislative history" before the A. B. A. shows that the notion of possible disqualifica-
tion of judges from hearing ex-partners never occurred to the delegates. See note 54 supra.
107. In the Pollock correspondence, Holmes refers to "my late partner Shattuck, a big
fellow, to whom I was much indebted and attached." 1 HowE, HoLmsss-PoLLocK L=nrRs
(1941) 75-6.
108. Welch v. Brimmer, 169 Mass. 204, 47 N. E. 699 (1897); Snow v. Alley, 144 Mass.
546, 11 N. E. 764 (1887); Snow v. Alley, 151 Mass. 14, 23 N. E. 576 (1890); Smyth v.
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practice in the Supreme Judicial Court for five justices, rather than
the full bench of seven, to hear most 'cases, and Holmes could, there-
fore, have absented himself had he desired.10 9
In hearing cases presented by ex-partners Holmes followed standard
Massachusetts practice. Precedent was set by Lemuel Shaw, the great
early Chief Justice of Massachusetts, who, though associated with
Sydney Bartlett for ten years prior to being appointed to the bench,
twice heard cases in which Bartlett was counsel."' In the twelve vol-
umes of Massachusetts reports studied there appear at' least 18 in-
stances in which members of the Holmes court sat in cases argued by
former law partners. I"
There is much evidence that Justices of the United States Supreme
Court have taken the same view. Justices have repeatedly heard argu-
ment by former partners where the case in question was not in the
office at the'time of termination of the partnership, and not a single
instance of disqualification for this reason has been uncovered. While
there may be exceptions-data of this nature is almost impossible to
search out systematically-it is certainly true that an overwhelming
number of cases support Justice Black's practice.
Examples illustrative of Supreme Court custom in this respect are
numerous. Justice Field sat in cases argued by David Dudley Field,
Phillips Academy, 154 Mass. 551, 28 N. E. 683 (1891); Day v. Worcester R. R., 151 Mass.
302, 23 N. E. 824 (1890); Oliver v. Oliver, 151 Mass. 349, 24 N. E. 51 (1890); Townsend
Bank v. Jones, 151 Mass. 454, 24 N. E. 593 (1890); Tinkham v. Sawyer, 153 Mass. 485, 27
N. E. 6 (1891); McConnellv. Wildes, 153 Mass. 487, 26 N. E. 1114 (1891).
109. In at least some Shattuck-Munroe cases Holmes did not sit, presumably because
it was not his "turn." However the number of such cases in his first two or three years on
the bench suggests that he disqualified in cases in his office at the time of his appointment.
Kansas Construc. Co. v. Topeka R. R., 135 Mass. 34 (1883); Denney v. Nettell, 135 Mass.
138 (1883); Smith v. Brown, 136 Mass. 416 (1884); Sears v. Fuller, 137 Mass. 326 (1884);
Haley v. Bellamy, 137 Mass. 357 (1884). It seems likely that all of these cases were in the
office before Holmes was appointed. In some, suit had been formally instituted before the
appointment. See, for example, Smith v. Brown, supra.
110. For an incident concerning one such appearance see 1 RENO, MEMOIRS OF TrE
JUDICIARY AND THE BAR OF NEW ENGLAND (1900) 58; and for an example see Boston & W.
R. R. Co. v. Dana, 67 Mass. 83, 91 (1854).
111. Chief Justice Field was a former partner of William Gaston, an ex-Governor who
appeared before Field frequently, as in Welch v. Adams, 152 Mass. 74, 25 N. E. 34 (1890);
Marsh v. Scituate, 153 Mass. 34, 26 N. E. 412 (1891). In some cases both Holmes' former
partner, Shattuck, and Gaston appeared, and both Holmes and Field participated; Oliver v.
Oliver, 151 Mass. 349, 24 N. E. 51 (1890); Smyth v. Phillips Academy, 154 Mass. 551, 28
N. E. 683 (1891). D. W. Bond, a former partner of Judge William Allen, appeared before
Judge Allen on several occasions; Dickenson, appellant, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (1890);
Brigham v. Hunt, 152 Mass. 257, 25 N. E. 468 (1890); Searl v. Dwelling House Ins. Corp,
152 Mass. 263, 25 N. E. 290 (1890). There is, of course, possibility of making an error in
compiling a list of this sort since there may be duplication of names by coincidence, and
fathirs may be confused with sons of the same name; but on the basis of analysis of a few
volumes, it is believed that a list of 70 to 100 appearances of ex-partners could be made for
the period Holmes sat on the Massachusetts Bench.
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his brother and living companion, and also his former law associate.112
Justice Harlan heard his former partner and close friend, Benjamin
Bristow, on at least one occasion 113 and Justice Pierce participated in
denying certiorari in a case presented by his former firm.114 Similarly
Justice Blatchford seems to have seen no impropriety in hearing cases
argued by an ex-partner." 5 Justice Brandeis did not disqualify himself
when his former associate, Edward F. McClennan appeared before the
Court.116 Almost exactly the same amount of time intervened between
the termination of the Brandeis-McClennan partnership and the lat-
ter's argument in Court as had intervened between the Black-Harris
partnership and the Jewell Ridge decision. The former partnership had,
moreover, endured for a much longer time.
The practice of Justice Cardozo in hearing argument by his former
associate Walter Pollak also supports Black's position. Pollak, who
graduated from law school in 1910, was in the firm of Cardozo and
Engelhard from 1911 to 1914. As a young man he formed an intimate
friendship with Cardozo which lasted until death. Despite his youth,
Pollak achieved almost instantaneous distinction in New York and is
credited with having managed Cardozo's selection for his first judicial
position in 1914."7 On many occasions thereafter Pollak argued for the
firm, then Engelhard and Pollak, before Judge Cardozo on the New
York Court of Appeals," 8 and after the latter's appointment to the
112. See note 51 supra. This is not to suggest that Field offers a model of judicial deco.
rum. It was necessary for Chief Justice Waite to remind Field on one occasion that Field
was so intimately connected with certain western railroad interests as to nake it undeirable
for Field to write the opinion of the Court in one of their cases. TRUIBLE, CiaM JUSTIcE:
WVATE (1938) 260-2.
113. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1882). He did not sit in Pollard v. Vinton, 105
U. S. 7 (1881), a case presented by Bristow which began before Harlan was appointed. For
brief discussion of the affectionate relationship of Harlan and Bristow see Frank, Appin i
mint of Supreme Court Justices, [19411 Wis. L. Rnv. 172, 207.
114. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 279 U.S. 851 (1929).
115. The firm of Blatchford, Seward & Griswold was an antecedent of the present
Cravath firm in New York. Prior to his Supreme Court appointment, Samuel A. Blatchford
was on the Federal District bench and there was some criticism of Seward's appearances
before him. To these criticisms Blatchford responded to Seward, "I hope you will decline no
case before me for no reason other than such as would induce you to decline it, if it were
before any other tribunal." Seward himself said: "I do not let the newspapers annoy me for
I know in my own conscience, that such attitudes are utterly unjustifiable and, in such case3
I have good precedents for living them down in silence." 1 Sw,,%n, Ta CRAvATI FMIu
(privately printed, 1946) 237-8. Cases in which Seward appeared before Blatchford in the
Supreme Court are Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449 (1884); St. Louis, I. M. & S. IL R. v.
Southern Express Co., 108 U. S. 24 (1883); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Dinsmore, 103 U. S. 30
(1883). See also SwAiN, supra, at 337.
116. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937). Mr. Justice JacL-on, then As3istant
Attorney General, presented this case for the Government.
117. HELLiux, BENjAmN N. CARwozo (1940) 53.
118. An example of a Pollak appearance is Pauchogue Land Corp. v. Long Island Park
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United States Supreme Court, Pollak was counsel in the two Scottsboro
cases. 119
Precedent in the Supreme Court would, therefore, seem to indicate
that Justice Jackson's position in criticising his colleague is at best
tenuous. But, says Justice Jackson in his letter to the Congressional
Committees, there is an exception: "I pointed out that to imply ap-
proval of his sitting would put the Court, and especially the Chief Jus-
tice, in a most inconsistent position. At that very moment the Court
was disabled from hearing an important case because Chief Justice
Stone declined to sit for the reason that the case was being presented
by his former law partners, although he had not been associated with
them for many years (the North American Co. and SEC and SEC vs.
Engineers Public Service Co.)." 120
Three years before, however, Chief Justice Stone had given his own
public explanation of why he did not choose to participate in the North
American case, and the reason he gave before the same Congressional
Committee to which a copy of the Jackson letter was addressed was
wholly different. According to his own statement the Chief Justice felt
disqualified not because of a former relationship with North American's
counsel but because North American itself was a former client of his.'
After Congress refused to reduce the statutory quorum, the Chief Jus-
tice withdrew his disqualification and in fact did sit in the case. 2
Comm., 243 N. Y. 15, 152 N. E. 451 (1926). For an account of Pollak with a discussion of
his cases see Stern, Memorial of Walter H. Pollak (1940-41) YEARBOOK, Ass'N OF TiE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N. Y. 507-13.
119. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600 (1935)
was presented orally by Mr. Pollak, and he filed a brief in the companion case of Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
120. Letter of Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson to Congressional Judiciary Com-
mittees, N. Y. Times, June 11, 1946, p. 2 , col. 6.
121. "In these cases, the disqualifications were due to one of two causes. As you
know, we have a number of ex-Attorney Generals and an ex-Solicitor General on the
Court, and in these particular cases, a number of members of the Court have had
something more to do with the case than the mere pro forma relations which an
Attorney General often has with cases in the Department of Justice.
"In one of the cases, the North American Company case also, that company is
an old client of the law firm of which I was formerly a member. As a youngster in
the office, I ran errands for it. It was one of our important clients after I became a
partner in the firm. It so happened, I think, that I never had any particular per-
sonal relations with that particular client, but you can readily understand how un-
desirable it would be for a member of the Supreme Court to sit in the case of the
client of his former firm, even though his relations with the client had not been at
all personal."
Hebrings before House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 124.
At another point the Chief Justice reiterated that the Court might lose its quorum be-
cause of the presence of a large number of ex-Department of Justice officials on the Bench
and because "there is always the chance that a Justice who has been in active practice will
have someone before him who has been a client." Id. at 25.
122. North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946) (finally decided April 1, 1946).
[Vol. 56: 605
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Furthermore, in several other cases arising both before and after the
Jewell Ridge case and before the Jackson letter, Stone did participate
in decisions though Sullivan and Cromwell, his former firm, was
counsel. 12
3
The practice of state supreme courts and federal circuit courts is
substantially in accord with that of the Massachusetts court at the
time of Holmes and of the United States Supreme Court. Although
judges responding to the Inquiry without exception disqualified them-
selves when a former partner presented a case which was in the office
on termination of the partnership, more than eighty percent of the
state and federal courts reporting a Yes or No answer do not disqualify
merely because the attorney in a case is a former partner.
CONCLUSION
So general a subject and one with so many facets as disqualification
scarcely permits of any conclusion more rounded than the obvious one
that the law grows apace. There is near unanimity of opinion among
courts as to the major situations which require disqualification on the
founding ground of interest; in the newer fields of relationship and bias
there is somewhat more division. The fastest growth today is in con-
nection with relationship of judge to attorney, and there it may be
123. The inconsistency of Chief Justice Stone's practice in cases where his former firm
was counsel suggests that he may have weighed each situation separately and not applied a
mechanical rule of thumb. He participated in decisions where the firm was representing a
former client in two cases. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sliosberg, 275 U. S. 526 (1927); Endi-
cott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501 (1943). Under similar circumstances he did
not participate in two cases. United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229 (1928); Sugar In-
stitute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936). He did not participate in the petition
for certiorari by the North American Co., North American Co. v. SEC, 318 U. S. 750 (1943),
and in the first decision in which four justices disqualified themselves, North American Co.
v. SEC, 320 U. S. 708 (1943). As noted in the text he later withdrew his disqualification and
participated in the decision. North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 6S6 (1946).
Where the party was not a former client he participated in Helvering v. Watts, 296
U. S. 387 (1935); Ripperger v. Allyn, 311 U. S. 695 (1940); Vinson v. Washington Gas Co.,
321 U. S. 489 (1944); FTC v. A. P. W. Paper Co., 326 U. S. 704 (1945). Although the party
was not a former client he disqualified himself in Banque de France v. Supreme Court of
New York, 316 U. S. 646 (1942).
The foregoing data was collected by Mr. Eustace Seligman, a former partner of Stone.
Mr. Seligman adds the following comment: "It does not seem possible from the above list
[of cases] to ascertain any consistent policy on Justice Stone's part. The explanation of why
he participated in Cases I and 7 [the Sliosberg and Perkins cases] may be that oving to the
large number of clients of Sullivan and Cromwell, Justice Stone did not know in these cases
whether they had been clients of the firm at the time that he vas a member of it. However,
there may have been other considerations present in his mind such as for example whether
or not he himself had any personal relationship with the client while he had been a member
of the firm, as to which facts cannot now be ascertained.
"Also in Case 6 [the Banque de France case] he appears to have followed a different and
stricter rule than in the other cases."
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noted that the trend has turned toward more general disqualification.
The whole series of distinctions based on presence or absence of a con-
tingent fee would seem at best a little silly, a reduction of the Yes or No
of disqualification to a level of grossness quite out of keeping with the
real moral values involved; and the sooner law based on such distinc-
tions disappears, the better.
On the momentarily spectacular problem of hearing ex-partners,
there is little that need be said when the evidence is in. Justice Black
heard an ex-partner twenty years after termination of the association.
In so doing he seems to have done pretty much what all judges do.
Not a case can be found to say him wrong, and over 80% of the state
and federal judges responding to the Inquiry follow the same rule.
Black's practice is at one with that of Justices Field, Harlan, Blatch-
ford, Butler, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone. Indeed it is
doubtful that any Supreme Court Justice has decided this question
differently. Had Black disqualified, he would have departed from the
traditions of 150 years.
APPENDIX
Tim INQUIRY INTO CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE
IN studying disqualification in appellate courts, it should be apparent
that wha judges do is a more real source of knowledge than what they say;
for disqualification by appellate judges seldom calls for formal opinions.
This is particularly true in matters of considerable delicacy of judgment, as
in the case of the intimate friend as counsel where the decision concerning
judicial conduct is unquestionably a matter of discretion.
To the end of determining what appellate judges actually do, the following
Inquiry was submitted to the forty-eight state chief justices and to at least
one judge-usually the senior circuit judge-of each federal court of appeals.
Thirty-one state courts and eight of the eleven federal courts answered the
Inquiry.
One point 'must be strongly emphasized in presenting the answers: these
judges were asked, not for their opinions as to what might be desirable for
others, but for their practice. The questions were presented deliberately to
avoid asking the judge of one court what he thought about the practice of
any other.
The Inquiry was circulated with the assurance that if any contributing
judges desired that their reports be kept confidential, they would be so held
by the Yale Law School Library for a twenty-year period. A very small pro-
portion indicated that they preferred that their reports be kept confidential;
and this proportion is so small that were their names omitted from listings
it would be quite apparent which they were. In order to insure that their
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reports would be kept confidential, it has appeared desirable to list the re-
sults by total only.
The state courts contributing are: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
All responses were by the chief justices except in the case of North Carolina
where the response was made by the marshal. Not every question was an-
swered by each court, and hence totals are not quite uniform. The New York
Court of Appeals, after consideration of the Inquiry in conference, concluded
that their practice is so entirely personal that most of the questions could
not be answered. The questions thus designated by that court have been
recorded in the totals under "no uniform practice."
The federal courts responding were the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals and the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. A member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals explained the practice in his Circuit did not permit of categorization
sufficient to permit answers to the specific questions. In some cases, notably
in the Second and Fourth Circuits, responses to the Inquiry were made by
the senior circuit judge and one or more other judges and occasionally there
was some deviation among these answers. In such instances the response of
the senior circuit judge is used for the totals published.





Yes No praaice arisen
S. F. S. F. S. P.S. F.
Is it the practice of judges of your court to disqualify
in any of the following situations?
1. Judge owns stock in corporate party 1  26 7 0 1 2 0 3 0
2. Judge has other pecuniary interest in party 27 S 0 0 1 1 3 2
3. Outcome of case may affect taxes in judge's local
community 0 0 26 5 2 0 3 3
4. Outcome of case may affect public utility rates in
judge's home community 1 1 20 4 2 0 8 3
1. Two state and two federal courts stated that judges have participated, usually
because the disqualification was waived, where a judge's stock ownership was extremely
small. The one federal answer in the NO column on this question is entered there because
the only instance in which the problem has arisen in recent years Nas in a case of an ex-
tremely slight holding; and the judges of that court would presumably disqualify if their
holdings were material.
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
II. RELATIONSHIP
Is it the practice of judges of your court to disqualify
in any of the following situations?
1. Party is relative 2
2. Attorney directly participating is relative and:
(a) receives contingent fee
(b) receives no contingent fee
3. Attorney not directly participating is relative and
another member of his firm or office is directly respon-
sible for case; and:
(a) firm or office receives contingent fee
(b) firm or office does not receive contingent fee
Yes No
S. F. S. F.
26 5 0 1
19 5 2 1
14 5 6 1










0 1 2 1
3 0 5 2
4 0 6 2
4 0 10 4
6 0 9 4
III. BIAS
Is it the practice of judges of your court to disqualify
in any of the following situations?
A. Attorney Contact
1. Attorney in case is former partner and:
(a) case was in office at time of termination
of association
(b) case was not in office at time of termi-
nation of association 3
2. Attorney in case is former faculty colleague
3. Attorney in case is former law clerk
4. Attorney in case is intimate personal friend 4
26 6 0 0 1
2. The one federal court answering this question NO added "unless the relation is
close." The same court answered that the judges would disqualify in the case of an attorney
relative if the attorney were a son, but not if he were a more distant relative.
3. One state added that in this and several situations the judge whose qualification Is
in question does not write the opinion. One federal judge who specifically emphasized that
he could not describe the practice of his associates, answered that he disqualified in cases of
appearance by former partners. His senior circuit judge gave the contrary answer for the
circuit.
Another state court, having no uniform practice, replied that its members disqualify
"usually but not always. In some instances there is participation, where the association
was terminated many years before-e.g., 20 years, and the judge feels he can act fairly."
One federal judge, responding that neither of the former partner situations has arisen,
added: "In my opinion a judge would disqualify in (a) but would not do so in (b) unless
either (1) the partnership was of recent date or (2) there was reason to think the partner
had been retained because of the former connection."
4. One federal court answered NO, but indicated that the answer would differ if the





1. Party in case is former client and:
(a) case was in office prior to judge going on
Bench





S. F. S. F. S.






5 2 16 5 6 1 2 0
C. Government Contact
1. judge is former government attorney (federal,
state, or local) and:
(a) case is one in which judge personally
participated for government; or 19 3 0 0
(b) case is presented by attorneys with whom
judge was associated in government; or 5 1 10 3
(c) judge participated in formulation of
policy which case involves 10 1 1 1
2. judge is former member of Legislature or
Congress, and case involves Act in passage
of which he played significant part S 1 4 2
2 0 10 5
2 0 14 4
4 1 16 5
6 1 16 4
IV. GENERAL
1. Do ex-members of your court on occasion
practice before it? 6
2. Do individual judges when doubtful concern-
ing their own disqualification consult the
other members of the Court?
3. Do judges disqualify at the suggestion of
counsel in cases in which the judge himself
considers the allegations of counsel base-
less? 7
26 2 4 2
27 6 1 0
0 0 1 4
2 0 0
3 3 8 1 5 1 15 3
5. One state court answering NO reserved the question of a long-time attorney-client
relationship.
6. One state court answering YES noted that the e-members of the court file briefs
but do not usually appear before it.
7. The federal court answering in the negative notes that the problem has arisen only
once.
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